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ABSTRACT
This Article is the first to examine age diversity in the legal literature,
mapping out its descriptive, normative, and legal dimensions. Age diversity
is a plural concept, as heterogeneity of age can take many forms in various
human institutions. Likewise, the normative rationales for these assorted
age diversities are rooted in distinct theoretical foundations, making the case
for or against age diversity contextual rather than universal. A host of legal
rules play a significant role in regulating age diversity, influencing the
presence of different generations in the workplace, judiciary, and Congress.
Better understanding the nature and consequences of age diversity allows us
to recognize the unique set of costs and benefits it entails and enriches our
understanding of other forms of difference. Further, examining the law with
an age diversity lens highlights fruitful avenues for legal reform in fields as
varied as immigration law, employment law, and the law of juries. In an era
of increased intergenerational tension and a rapidly aging population, the
time is ripe to evaluate age diversity and the law’s role in shaping it.

INTRODUCTION
During her first election campaign, Representative Alexandria OcasioCortez claimed that “we need to elect a generation of new people to
Congress. We have to have a diversity of age.”1 As a descriptive matter,
Ocasio-Cortez may have a point: the average age in the House of
Representatives is 57.6, while it is 62.9 in the Senate.2 Silicon Valley seems
to have the opposite problem.3 In August 2019, Google settled an age
discrimination lawsuit for eleven million dollars, agreeing to create age
diversity committees to prevent future instances of age bias against older
employees.4 Such lawsuits are not uncommon,5 and those plaintiffs may also
have a point: the median age of employees at technology companies like
1 Philip Bump, When it Comes to Generational Diversity in Congress, Ocasio-Cortez
Has a Point, WASH. POST (June 28, 2018).
2 See CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, MEMBERSHIP OF THE 116TH CONGRESS: A
PROFILE 2 (2019).
3 See VISIER INSIGHTS REPORT: THE TRUTH ABOUT AGEISM IN THE TECH INDUSTRY 2
(2017) (“There is systemic ageism in Tech hiring practices: Tech hires a higher proportion of
younger workers and a smaller proportion of older workers than Non-Tech.”).
4 See Heath v. Google LLC, No. 15-CV-01824-BLF, 2019 WL 3842075, at *2 (N.D.
Cal. Aug. 15, 2019) (“Defendant agrees to a gross settlement amount of $11 million.); id at
*3 (“Defendant has also agreed to certain ‘programmatic relief’ for four years, including . . .
the creation of a subcommittee within recruiting that will focus on age diversity.”).
5 See Carolyn Hymowitz & Robert Burnson, It’s Tough Being Over 40 in Silicon Valley,
BLOOMBERG (Sep. 8, 2016, 10:50 AM) (noting the large number of age discrimination
lawsuits against technology companies in California, especially as compared to race and
gender discrimination lawsuits).
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Facebook and LinkedIn is 28 and 29 respectively.6 Finally, in the criminal
justice system, prosecutors and criminal defense attorneys regularly use their
peremptory challenges to remove younger and older individuals respectively
from the jury box, making it less age diverse in service of predicted trial
outcomes.7 In the recent case of Johnson v. State, a prosecutor even admitted
that he would strike any juror under the age of 25 because he “did not want
kids on his jury.”8 The court found no error,9 though one judge was “deeply
disturbed” by the practice.10
These cases illustrate how heterogeneity on the dimension of age—age
diversity—implicates a wide range of socio-legal contexts. Yet it has thus
far received no attention in the legal literature.11 Scholars studying diversity
normally spotlight the critical category of race,12 which is unsurprising given
that racial justice movements gave birth to diversity as a normative ideal.13
The time is ripe, however, to critically examine age diversity. The aging of
the population has led to a broader range of ages in public and private
institutions, generating tensions about the allocation of resources and power
in society.14 This intergenerational conflict materializes in the countless
think pieces arguing that Millennials are entitled or lazy,15 and the response
of “Okay, Boomer,” which has appeared on social media and even in a recent
6

See Annaele Pelisson & Avery Hartmans, The Average Age of Employees at All the
Top Tech Companies, in One Chart, BUS. INSIDER (Sep. 11, 2017 9:24PM).
7 See Shamena Anwar et al., The Role of Age in Jury Selection and Trial Outcomes, 57
J. L. & ECON. 1001, 1027 (2014) (“[T]he age of the jury has a causal effect on trial outcomes
and . . . prosecution and defense attorneys take age into account when using their peremptory
challenges to shape the seated jury.”).
8 See Johnson v. State, No. 2017-KA-01722-COA, 2019 WL 2265282, at *4 (Miss. Ct.
App. May 28, 2019), reh’g denied (Oct. 1, 2019) (declaring age as a permissible race-neutral
reason for peremptory strikes in the context of Batson challenges).
9 See id.
10 See id. at *7–8 (“I write separately because I am deeply disturbed by the prosecutor’s
use of peremptory challenges against potential jurors under the age of twenty-five. . . .
Diversity, including age diversity, is never a bad thing because it brings different perspectives
and opinions into the jury room.”) (Westbrooks, J., concurring).
11 See B. EVAN BLAINE & KIMBERLY J. MCCLURE BRENCHLEY, UNDERSTANDING THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF DIVERSITY 5 (3d ed. 2018) (“Age diversity receives little research attention,
but that should change with the expected growth of the senior citizen population in the next
20 years.”).
12 See ELLEN BERREY, THE ENIGMA OF DIVERSITY 25–30 (2015) (“When used without
qualifiers, it commonly refers a heterogeneous mix of racial, ethnic, and language groups.
Often, it simply implies the presence of racial minorities, often just African Americans.”).
13 See id. at 25-30 (recounting the intellectual history of diversity as a normative ideal).
14 See Michael S. North & Susan T. Fiske, An Inconvenienced Youth? Ageism and Its
Potential Intergenerational Roots, 138 PSYCHOL. BULL. 982, 987–89 (2012) (discussing the
psychological roots of intergenerational conflict); Simon Biggs, Thinking About Generations:
Conceptual Positions and Policy Implications, 63 J. SOC. ISSUES 695, 704 (2007) (“[T]he
transfer of generational power is a key function that policy needs to address as part of a process
of social renewal.”).
15 See, e.g., Joel Stein, Millennials: The Me Me Me Generation, TIME (May 20, 2013)
(describing Millennials as “lazy, entitled, selfish, and shallow”).
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Supreme Court oral argument.16 This demographic transition also has a
racial dimension, as much of the coming racial diversity in the United States
derives from younger cohorts.17 Thus, a comprehensive understanding of
racial diversity requires examining how it intersects with age diversity.18
The goal of this Article is to introduce age diversity to the legal literature
by mapping out its descriptive, normative, and legal dimensions.19 What
emerges is a rich and complex picture. Age diversity is itself diverse,
including minimal or maximal heterogeneity of age, an age range mirroring
a reference population, or an assortment of ages keyed to some variable for
which age is a proxy.20 The normative rationales for these assorted age
diversities are rooted in distinct theoretical foundations, and they thus vary
considerably based on the context in which they are examined. While
demographic concerns might drive the ideal age diversity at the societal
level, issues of distributive justice, representation, group efficacy, and
ageism might better inform the analysis at the institutional level.21 The
multiplicity of forms that age diversity can take as well as their associated
normative justifications highlight that age diversity is a plural and contextual
concept, rather than a singular or universal one.
These normative aspects of age diversity have implications for law, as
several legal rules play a critical role in shaping age diversity in human
institutions. Age-conscious rules explicitly incorporate age into legal
directives, often in service of establishing eligibility criteria for membership
in institutions.22 For example, the Constitution explicitly adopts age
minimums to hold a seat in Congress.23 This excludes youth from serving
16 See Oral Argument at 15:45, Babb v. Wilkie (No. 18-882) (Jan. 15, 2020),
https://www.oyez.org/cases/2019/18-882 (containing the following question by Chief Justice
John Roberts regarding age discrimination law: “[L]et’s say . . . the hiring person is younger,
says, you know, “OK Boomer,” . . . is that actionable?”); Taylor Lorenz, ‘OK Boomer’ Marks
the End of Friendly Generational Relations, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 29, 2019) (“‘Ok boomer’ has
become Generation Z’s endlessly repeated retort to the problem of older people who just don’t
get it, a rallying cry for millions of fed up kids.”).
17 See WILLIAM H. FREY, DIVERSITY EXPLOSION: HOW NEW RACIAL DEMOGRAPHICS ARE
REMAKING AMERICA 247 (2014) (“Perhaps the biggest demographic fault line in the coming
decades is the cultural generation gap—the lack of intimate connections between an
increasingly diverse young population and the mostly white older population.”).
18 See PATRICIA HILL COLLINS & SIRMA BILGE, INTERSECTIONALITY 2 (2016) (“[P]eople’s
lives and the organization of power in a given society are better understood as being shaped
not by a single axis of social division, be it gender or race or class, but by many axes that
work together and influence each other.”).
19 See Nina A. Kohn, A Framework for Theoretical Inquiry into Law and Aging, 21
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 187, 189–93 (2020) (noting the importance of theory in the field
of law and aging).
20 See infra Part I.B.
21 See infra Part II.
22 See infra Part III.A.1.
23 See U.S. CONST. art I, § 2 (“No Person shall be a Representative who shall not have
attained to the Age of twenty five Years”); id. at art I, § 3 (“No Person shall be a Senator who
shall not have attained to the Age of thirty Years”).
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and reduces the age diversity of our political institutions, even as they are
intended to reflect the diversity of the population.24 In contrast, age
discrimination rules, such as the Age Discrimination in Employment Act,25
bar the consideration of age in various domains.26 These laws leave the age
compositions of groups to other social forces, for good or ill. Finally, ageneutral rules are often geared toward some other policy objective, making
age diversity a byproduct of the legal regulation.27 For instance, the principle
of random selection for jury members has the effect of creating a jury pool
that more or less mirrors the age diversity of the citizenry, while peremptory
challenges threaten that diversity.28
This Article functions not only as an introduction to age diversity, but
also as a call for an increased consciousness of the age composition of our
institutions.29 Examining these institutions with an age diversity lens brings
to light a unique set of costs and benefits that might otherwise go
unappreciated in policy debates. This, in turn, can highlight opportunities
for legal reform in a variety of areas.30 This age consciousness will also
enrich diversity discussions more broadly. Just as age intersects with other
forms of difference among individuals, so too is age diversity part and parcel
of a larger conversation about diversity of race, sex, or class.31
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I discusses the conceptual
categories of age and diversity and describes some of the major forms that
age diversity can take. Part II maps out the normative terrain of age diversity,
exploring the various theoretical rationales for and against the assorted forms
that age diversity might take. Part III describes the ways in which age
diversity intersects with the law. It examines the different types of legal rules
that shape the age composition of society and its institutions. It then
demonstrates how analyzing legal areas with age diversity in mind can
provide insights into current debates in immigration law, the law of juries,
and employment law.
See ANNE PHILLIPS, THE POLITICS OF PRESENCE 6 (1995) (“Adequate representation is
increasingly interpreted as implying a more adequate representation of the different social
groups that make up the citizen body.”).
25 See 29 U.S.C. § 623 (2012) (“It shall be unlawful for an employer—(1) to fail or refuse
to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual’s age . . . .”).
26 See infra Part III.A.2.
27 See infra Part III.A.3.
28 See NANCY S. MARDER, THE JURY PROCESS 51 (2005) (“The main constitutional issue
raised by the summoning of the venire is whether those summoned represent a “fair cross
section” of the community.”).
29 See James D. Schmidt, The Ends of Innocence: Age As A Mode of Inquiry in Sociolegal
Studies, 32 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1029, 1050–55 (2007) (arguing for the inclusion of agebased analyses in legal scholarship).
30 See infra Part III.B.
31 See Vicki Schultz, Life’s Work, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1881, 1938–39 (2000) (noting
that we must acknowledge demographic and individual diversity along multiple axes).
24
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I. WHAT IS AGE DIVERSITY?
This Part provides the background for the Article’s exploration of age
diversity. Section A examines the variable of age, understanding it as an
important aspect of both individual identity and social organization. Section
B explores the concept of diversity, the many forms it takes, and the need to
understand it in the specific context in which it arises.
A. Age
At the most basic level, age is simply the numerical measure of time that
has elapsed since one’s birth.32 This gives age a unique temporal quality
among the various categories of identity.33 While people predictably
progress through different age groups in one direction over time, other
identity characteristics like race or sex do not possess the same inevitable
fluidity.34 Age’s numerical nature also makes it particularly useful from an
administrative standpoint, which explains its widespread use in the law.35
The number by itself is important beyond mere administrative
convenience, however, as it can convey some information about an
individual’s development or biology. For example, we know something
about the physical and mental capacities of a three-year old based simply on
her age.36 The picture becomes much murkier once one becomes an adult,
as variation in the population trumps the predictive power of age.37 Still,
there are certain trends in how the aging process plays out at the population
level. For instance, younger individuals tend to score more highly on fluid
intelligence, or the ability to reason abstractly without reference to prior
experience, while older individuals score more highly on crystallized
intelligence, or the ability to apply previous knowledge and experiences to

32

See Richard A. Settersen, Jr. & Bethany Godlewski, Concepts and Theories of Age
and Aging, in HANDBOOK OF THEORIES OF AGING 9, 10 (Vern L. Bengtson & Richard A.
Settersen, Jr. eds., 3d ed. 2016) (“Chronological age is ultimately an index of absolute time
(years since birth) that stems from a human-made calendar.”).
33 See Alexander A. Boni-Saenz, Age, Time, and Discrimination, 53 GA. L. REV. 845,
859 (describing how age is unique in that it is “inevitably mutable.”).
34 See id. at 858–59 (describing how age differs from other categories of identity). Other
categories of identity also possess some fluidity, though it is far from inevitable. See, e.g.,
Ian F. Haney López, The Social Construction of Race: Some Observations on Illusion,
Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 39 (1994) (describing race as a
complex interplay between chance, context, and choice).
35 See Boni-Saenz, supra note 33, at 854–56 (describing the many ways in which the law
employs age).
36 See, e.g., Clare Huntington, Early Childhood Development and the Law, 90 S. CAL. L.
REV. 755, 767–68 (2017) (discussing neurological development in early childhood).
37 See Linda S. Whitton, Ageism: Paternalism and Prejudice, 46 DEPAUL L. REV. 453,
468 (1997) (“[B]oth cognitive and physiological changes occur in varying degrees and at
individuated rates.”).
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problem-solving.38 To acknowledge these trends is not to embrace age
essentialism, or the belief that age conveys something “irreducible,
unchanging, and therefore constitutive of a given person or thing.”39 While
age produces observable regularities at the population level, that does not
necessarily mean that any particular characteristic is shared by individuals
of the same age.40
Age is also more than just a number. It is a salient social signifier that
gives membership in a particular age group and cohort.41 An age group is a
collection of individuals of the same age, which can be defined narrowly—
such as those who are twenty-five—or more broadly, such as those in their
sixties.42 Age groups occupy specific positions on a standardized lifecourse,
or the sequence of socially-defined events and roles in a person’s life.43 Each
place on that lifecourse, in turn, dictates what is socially acceptable behavior
and informs when one should begin schooling, have children, or retire.44 The
law often regulates these life stages, for instance by mandating schooling at
certain ages or providing Social Security benefits at the age of retirement.45

38 See John L. Horn & Raymond B. Cattell, Age Differences in Fluid and Crystallized
Intelligence, 26 ACTA PSYCHOLOGICA 107, 125 (1967) (finding the mean level of fluid and
crystallized intelligence to be higher for younger and older adults respectively).
39 DIANA FUSS, ESSENTIALLY SPEAKING: FEMINISM, NATURE & DIFFERENCE 2 (1989).
While age essentialism can have many costs, it is not per se bad. See Devon W. Carbado &
Cheryl I. Harris, Intersectionality at 30: Mapping the Margins of Anti-Essentialism,
Intersectionality, and Dominance Theory, 132 HARV. L. REV. 2193, 2205–06 (2019)
(critiquing the view that essentialism is essentially bad).
40 See Norman B. Ryder, The Cohort as a Concept in the Study of Social Change, 30 AM.
SOC. REV. 843, 847 (1965) (“The attractive simplicity of birth cohort membership as signified
by age cannot conceal ways in which this identification is cross-cut and attenuated by
differentiation.”).
41 See JOHN MACNICOL, AGE DISCRIMINATION 3–4 (2006) (“A basic truism of
gerontology is that age per se is meaningless: it is always mediated through social processes
and cultural attitudes.”).
42 See Victor Marshall, Generations, Age Groups and Cohorts, 2 CANADIAN J. ON AGING
51, 55-56 (1984) (describing age strata or age groups).
43 See JANET Z. GIELE AND GLEN H. ELDER JR. METHODS OF LIFE COURSE RESEARCH 22
(1998) (defining life course as a “sequence of socially defined events and roles that the
individual enacts over time”).
44 See HOWARD EGLIT, ELDERS ON TRIAL: AGE AND AGEISM IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL
SYSTEM 7 (2004) (“Age also functions informally as a powerful normative device for
influencing--and sometimes dictating--attitudes and conduct. . . . ‘Act your age’ is a common
admonition reflecting this phenomenon”); Bernice L. Neugarten et al., Age Norms, Age
Constraints, and Adult Socialization, in THE MEANINGS OF AGE (Dail A. Neugarten ed. 1996)
(“There exists what might be called a prescriptive timetable for the ordering of major life
events: a time in the lifespan when men and women are expected to marry, a time to raise
children, a time to retire.”).
45 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3321.01 (West 2018) (“A child between six and eighteen
years of age is ‘of compulsory school age’”); What is Full Retirement Age?, 20 C.F.R. §
404.409 (2015) (“Full retirement age has been 65 but is being gradually raised to age 67
beginning with people born after January 1, 1938.”).
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A birth date also grants membership in a particular cohort, or a group of
people born around the same time who progress through various age groups
together.46 Such cohorts are often categorized as generations, or groups of
people who have close birth dates and have experienced similar formative
socio-historical moments in a particular cultural context.47 These shared
experiences, in turn, shape a given generation’s outlook and values.48 For
example, Millennials’ formative experiences with the Internet make them
“digital natives,” in contrast to prior generations who are “digital
immigrants.”49
Age also affects individuals and structures society through the negative
force of ageism, defined as prejudice, stereotyping, or discrimination on the
basis of age or perceived age.50 Ageist attitudes, actions, and laws limit
opportunities or channel resources to certain individuals or groups on the
basis of age.51 However, age-based advantage or disadvantage is sensitive
to context in a different way than other categories such as race or sex.52 For
example, the history of race is one of slavery, Jim Crow, redlining, and mass
incarceration, and this history of racial injustice informs how structural
racism functions in the present.53 Racial disadvantage cuts across most
contexts in much the same way, providing consistent advantages to those
classified as white.54 The picture is more complicated with age. In some
46

See Marshall, supra note 42, at 52 (describing cohorts)
See Karl Mannheim, The Problem of Generations, in KARL MANNHEIM: ESSAYS 290
(Paul Kecskemeti ed., 1952) (“Individuals who belong to the same generation, who share the
same year of birth, are endowed, to that extent, with a common location in the historical
dimension of the social process.”).
48 See, e.g., GLEN H. ELDER, JR., CHILDREN OF THE GREAT DEPRESSION 183–200 (1999)
(discussing the effects of economic deprivation on the outlook of people who experienced the
Great Depression).
49 See MICHAEL THOMAS, DECONSTRUCTING DIGITAL NATIVES 30–43 (2011) (discussing
and critiquing the concepts of digital natives and digital immigrants).
50 See Thomas Nicolaj Iversen et al., A Conceptual Analysis of Ageism, 61 NORDIC
PSYCHOL. 4, 15 (2009) (“Ageism is defined as negative or positive stereotypes, prejudice
and/or discrimination against (or to the advantage of) elderly people on the basis of their
chronological age or on the basis of a perception of them as being ‘old’ or ‘elderly’. Ageism
can be implicit or explicit and can be expressed on a micro-, meso- or macro-level.”). While
this is the most comprehensive definition of ageism in the literature, it requires further
tweaking to acknowledge that ageism may be directed at any age group, not just the elderly.
51 See ERDMAN B. PALMORE, AGEISM: NEGATIVE AND POSITIVE 119–151 (1999)
(collecting instances of ageism in the economy, government, family, housing, and health
care).
52 See Howard C. Eglit, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act at Age Thirty: Where
It’s Been, Where It Is Today, Where It’s Going, 31 U. RICH. L. REV. 579, 676 (1997) (“Ageism
is not equivalent, either in its genesis nor its manifestations, to racism.”).
53 See MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF
COLORBLINDNESS 1 (2012) (describing how the manifestation of racial disadvantage change
but the end effects are the same); Ta-Nehisi Coates, The Case for Reparations, THE ATLANTIC
(June 2014) (describing the connected histories of racial disadvantage).
54 See Cass R. Sunstein, The Anticaste Principle, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2410, 2411 (1994)
(noting a “special problem of inequality” when social and legal practices translate “highly
47
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settings, it may be youth who are at the bottom of the social hierarchy.55 For
example, few younger individuals are in a position to wield significant power
in the political world.56 However, in other realms, such as entertainment and
media, it may be older individuals who are most marginalized. Youth is a
valued commodity in this realm, and those who are older are often devalued
compared to younger and newer celebrities of interest.57 This shifting set of
power dynamics creates the need to analyze age—and age diversity—more
contextually.
Thus, age structures both personal identity and social organization in
powerful ways. However, age intersects with other important categories
such as race, sex, and class to produce unique individuals with different
interests and mindsets.58 In addition, these different aspects of identity can
intersect in ways that produce unique experiences and forms of
disadvantage.59 For example, younger Black people are more likely to face
policing and incarceration than other groups due to racist and ageist
stereotypes associating Blackness and youth with criminal behavior.60

visible and morally irrelevant differences into systemic social disadvantage”); Cheryl I.
Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1709, 1713–14 (1993) (describing white
privilege as a form of property interest). This is not to ignore the different manifestations of
racism for non-black racial minority groups, which have their own important historical
legacies and present manifestations. See Maritza I. Reyes, Opening Borders: African
Americans and Latinos Through the Lens of Immigration, 17 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 1, 54
(2014) (arguing that African Americans and Latinos need to be “proactive and conscious
about recognizing their similar and different experiences with oppression.”); Robert S. Chang,
Toward an Asian American Legal Scholarship: Critical Race Theory, Post-Structuralism, and
Narrative Space, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1241, 1252–64 (1993) (discussing the particular racial
disadvantages faced by Asian-Americans).
55 See Pamela Ann Gordon, Age Diversity in the Workplace, in DIVERSITY AND
INCLUSION IN THE GLOBAL WORKPLACE 31, 35 (Carlos Tasso Eira de Aquino & Robert W.
Robertson eds., 2018) (“Age discrimination might affect many different ages, including the
young and middle-aged.”).
56 See Bump, supra note 1 (describing the age skew in Congress towards older people).
57 See Ann Hornaday, Hollywood Ageism Punishes Actresses, But the Art House Offers
Some Hope, WASH. POST (Mar. 9, 2017) (“[T]here’s no doubt that women are far more
affected by the movie industry’s obsession with sex appeal and physical beauty, resulting in
a giant absence in female roles once actresses reach their 50s and 60s.”).
58 See COLLINS & BILGE, supra note 18, at 2; Trina Grillo, Anti-Essentialism and
Intersectionality: Tools to Dismantle the Master’s House, 10 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 16, 27
(1995) (arguing for spending our time trying to understand the relationships between different
categories of identity); Angela P. Harris, Foreword: The Jurisprudence of Reconstruction, 82
CAL. L. REV. 741, 768 (1994) (noting how intersectionality allows for those at the
intersections to be recognized as “proper legal subjects”).
59 See Kimberlé Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black
Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory, and Antiracist Politics,
1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 139–40 (noting the need to center the experiences of those at the
intersections)
60 See L. Song Richardson & Phillip Atiba Goff, Interrogating Racial Violence, 12 OHIO
ST. J. CRIM. L. 115, 146 (2014) (discussing how privileged groups work with police to
implement policies that subordinate young black men and people of color).
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Similarly, older women are more likely to feel the burden of societal
expectations about beauty because of sexist norms that place a woman’s
value in her appearance, as well as the ageist judgment that only youthfulness
is attractive.61 It is therefore critical to attend to these intersectional effects
when considering age and the age diversity of various societal institutions.
B. Diversity
At a descriptive level, diversity simply identifies the existence of
heterogeneity in a group.62 In this basic sense, almost every group of people
is diverse in some way, as no two individuals are identical. Thus, the concept
requires further specification by selecting the dimension on which to assess
diversity.63 In the United States, the characteristic of interest has typically
been race, and this is unsurprising given diversity’s origins.64 As a social
and political ideal, diversity grew out of the civil rights movement and
gained traction in the late 1960s as a tool to promote racial integration after
formal legal barriers to it had fallen.65 As a legal rationale, it came to
prominence in the seminal affirmative action case of Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke, which held that diversity was a compelling
state interest that made permissible the consideration of race in public school
admissions.66 In the 1980s, the pursuit of diversity evolved into an
institutional practice, often implemented by human resource professionals in
the business world.67 Nowadays, diversity is a mantra for everyone from

61

See TONI CALASANTI & KATHLEEN F. SLEVIN, GENDER, SOCIAL INEQUALITIES, AND
AGING 54 (2001) (“[A]geism interfaces with sexism to put pressure on women to be a
particular shape and size, to portray a youthful image even if old.”).
62 See Diversity, CAMBRIDGE ENGLISH DICTIONARY, https://dictionary.cambridge.org/
dictionary/english/diversity (“the fact of many different types of things or people being
included in something; a range of different things or people.”).
63 See Ira Katznelson, Diversity in Institutional Life: Levels and Objects, in OUR
COMPELLING INTERESTS: THE VALUE OF DIVERSITY FOR DEMOCRACY AND A PROSPEROUS
SOCIETY 182, 185 (Earl Lewis & Nancy Cantor eds., 2017) (“[D]iversity is both appropriate
as a cover word but also rather too general unless calibrated and specified more exactly in its
analytical and normative dimensions as a category and rationale.”).
64 See BERREY, supra note 12, at 26 (noting how diversity typically refers to racial, ethnic,
or language groups). In some contexts, the focus has been less on race, and more on gender.
See, e.g., Askhaya Kamalnath, Defining “Diversity” in Corporate Governance: A Global
Survey, 45 J. LEGIS. 1, 2 (2019) ([T]he term “diversity” in corporate governance is focused
most specifically on only one type of “diversity,” i.e. gender diversity.”).
65 See BERREY, supra note 12 at 30 (“[Diversity’s] earliest supporters were white college
administrators and community activists trying to encourage black integration into exclusively
white universities and neighborhoods.”).
66 438 U.S. 265, 314 (1978) (“[T]he interest of diversity is compelling in the context of
a university’s admissions program.”).
67 See BERREY, supra note 12 at 34–46 (describing how the corporate world found
diversity a useful way to comply with vague antidiscrimination mandates).
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politicians to business executives to university presidents, and it has been
applied to various other types of difference as well.68
This Article extends the diversity analysis to age.69 The next Part
explores the implications of such an extension for normative arguments
about diversity, but it has implications for its more descriptive aspects as
well. For example, age’s numerical nature might make evaluating diversity
of age easier in some ways, if one adopts certain mathematical constructs for
diversity measurement.70 However, age’s unique temporal qualities also
make age diversity a moving target, unlike other forms of diversity. Even if
an institution retains an initial age-diverse membership, the age composition
68 See WALTER BENN MICHAELS, THE TROUBLE WITH DIVERSITY: HOW WE LEARNED TO
LOVE IDENTITY AND IGNORE INEQUALITY 12 (2006) (“Indeed, diversity has become virtually
a sacred concept in American life today. No one’s really against it; people tend to differ only
in their degrees of enthusiasm for it and their ingenuity in pursuing it.”); PETER W. WOOD,
DIVERSITY: THE INVENTION OF A CONCEPT 8 (2003) (“The pursuit of diversity is held to be
both practically good and personally redemptive; and diversity is depicted in popular
entertainment as both fun and—there is no better word for it—virtuous.”).
69 Some might question adding another dimension to diversity analyses, seeing diversity
discourse as a distraction from more pressing discussions of identity-based injustice or
economic inequality. See MICHAELS, supra note 68, at 6 (arguing that a focus on identity
issues has led to a neglect of issues of class and economic inequality); Joyce M. Bell &
Douglas Hartmann, Diversity in Everyday Discourse: The Cultural Ambiguities and
Consequences of “Happy Talk”, 72 AM. SOC. REV. 895, 906 (2007) (“[D]iversity discourse
separates discussions about diversity, difference, and multiculturalism from more
uncomfortable conversations about inequality, power, and privilege.”). Implicit in these
arguments is the belief that diversity itself lacks substance, and the benefits of shifting the
discourse in its direction are thus negligible. See Peter H. Schuck, Affirmative Action: Past,
Present, and Future, 20 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 1, 37 (2002) (“Diversity, like equality, is an
idea that is at once complex and empty until it is given descriptive and normative content and
context.”). It is certainly the case that an exclusive focus on diversity of any type would be a
mistake, and this Article does not suggest that this is a desirable approach. However, these
critiques remind us that we must not let age diversity become just an empty slogan. It is
important to define with precision what we mean by it, what the benefits and costs of it are,
and how it applies in different contexts. This type of clarity with respect to age diversity is
the primary aim of this Article.
70 See, e.g., Aisling Daly et al., Ecological Diversity: Measuring the Unmeasurable, 6
MATHEMATICS 119, 120 (2018) (describing several criteria for evaluating mathematical
measures of diversity). For age, we might take advantage of its numerical nature to employ
various measures of statistical variability for measurement purposes. See SCOTT E. PAGE,
DIVERSITY AND COMPLEXITY 56–57 (2011) (describing variance and standard deviation). If
we want to better capture some meaningful social distinctions associated with age, an
alternative is to measure the number and quantity of types within a group. See id. (describing
entropy measures that capture distributions across types). For example, we might evaluate
how well represented different generations (e.g. Gen Z, Gen X) or age groups (e.g. young,
old) are in an institution. This substitutes accuracy for precision, as defining generations or
age groups can be a fraught exercise, as these categories are contested and highly contextsensitive.
See GAIL WILSON, UNDERSTANDING OLD AGE: CRITICAL AND GLOBAL
PERSPECTIVES 17–19 (2000) (discussing different cultural understandings of age). We need
not resolve these measurement debates to proceed with the more conceptual analysis pursued
by this Article, but it is worth highlighting the multiple ways to measure diversity in general,
and age diversity in particular.
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of that institution will naturally change over time due to the aging of its
members.
In analyzing this extension of diversity to the domain of age, it is
important to remember that any discussion of age diversity takes place within
a larger discussion about diversity along other dimensions.71 This is an
inevitable byproduct of the intersection of age with other aspects of identity.
This Article should thus be seen as a call for including age in such diversity
discussions, rather than supplanting important conversations around other
forms of diversity. There are, however, demographic links between age and
other identity characteristics as well that make these discussions naturally
complementary. Much of the coming racial diversity in the United States
derives from younger cohorts, and this has implications for our politics.72 As
one commentator put it, the current and future political cleavages in the
United States may be best described not as black versus white, but gray
versus brown.73 Thus, age diversity itself may have effects on other types of
diversity and vice versa, and these cross-identity effects may also have
normative implications.
With a basic understanding of age and its relationship to other
demographic characteristics, it is worth detailing some of the types of
heterogeneity that are important for the diversity analysis here. The first type
is minimal diversity, which only requires the presence of one person who is
different on the relevant dimension in a group.74 For example, before the
appointment of Sandra Day O’Connor in 1981, the Supreme Court was not
diverse in terms of sex.75 After the appointment, the Supreme Court was
technically diverse as it exhibited heterogeneity of sex. But if the analysis
were to stop there, diversity discussions would be relatively short and
uninteresting.76 This is even truer of age, as achieving minimal diversity
71 See Schultz, supra note 31, at 1938–39 (noting that we must acknowledge
demographic and individual diversity along multiple axes).
72 See FREY, supra note 17, at 21 (“The sweeping racial changes transforming much of
the American landscape are segmented by an important demographic dimension: age. The
infusions of new waves of Hispanics and Asians and multiracial Americans is most evident
among younger age groups.”).
73 See Ronald Brownstein, The Gray and the Brown: The Generational Mismatch, THE
NAT’L J. (July 24, 2010) (describing the political divide between an older, whiter cohort and
much more diverse younger cohorts).
74 See Patrick S. Shin & Mitu Gulati, Showcasing Diversity, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1017, 1027
(2011) (“It is true that sometimes, when we talk about diversity, we are referring just to the
presence of any level of heterogeneity in a group. Diversity in this minimal descriptive sense,
though, could not possibly be regarded as evidence of operative norms of equality and
nondiscrimination.”).
75 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements on
Constitutional Law in the Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2062, 2143 (2002)
(“Reagan's first Supreme Court appointee was Sandra Day O'Connor, the first woman to serve
on the Court.”).
76 This is in part why advocates of diversity have urged a renewed focus on inclusion,
rather than just on the numbers that would entail diversity. See HOWARD J. ROSS,
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merely requires adding to a homogeneous group one individual who was
born at a different time or in a different generation, and the pool from which
to draw such an individual is quite large. Further, establishing minimal
diversity as the goal has troubling normative implications, as it may
constitute tokenism.77
In its place, one might aim for mirror diversity, which entails a group
composition that mirrors a reference population.78 This type of diversity is
of particular normative interest in contexts where representation matters.79
When President Bill Clinton said that he wanted his cabinet to “look like
America,” it is mirror diversity—with the reference population being the
United States as a whole—for which he was implicitly aiming.80 In the age
context, we could assemble a group that achieved mirror diversity of the
United States population by inviting the following proportions of individuals
to a hypothetical group of 100 people: 28 of Generation Z, 22 Millennials,
20 of Generation X, 22 Baby Boomers, 7 of the Silent Generation, and 1 of
the Greatest Generation.81
Alternatively, one might desire maximal diversity, or the presence of the
widest range or variability in a group on the relevant dimension.82 This type
of diversity might be important if heterogeneity itself is valuable in a certain
context, for instance because it might provide a variety of viewpoints or
experiences that enrich group activities.83 If you were recruiting a group of
seven people and wanted it to be maximally age diverse, you could invite to
the group one member of every living generation on Earth, each roughly 20
years apart. Thus, you would recruit a newborn, someone aged around 20,
40, 60, 80, and 100. You might have to settle for a slightly younger person
to represent the eldest generation, as the oldest verified living person on

REINVENTING DIVERSITY 38 (2011) (defining inclusion as “how fully involved people are in
the structures of their organizations and societies”).
77 See Linda S. Greene, Tokens, Role Models and Pedagogical Politics: Lamentations of
an African American Female Law Professor, 6 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L. J. 81, 84 (1991)
(“Limited inclusion of persons visibly different from the dominant group is the essence of
tokenism.”).
78 See Dawinder S. Sidhu, Racial Mirroring, 17 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1335, 1338 (2015)
(defining “racial mirroring” as “attempts to ensure that individuals in one defined group
reflect the racial composition of another group”).
79 See infra Part II.C (discussing representation as an age diversity rationale).
80 See Mitchell Locin, Clinton Finishes Cabinet of Diversity, CHI. TRIB. (December 25,
1992) (“Clinton pledged during the campaign that his administration would ‘look like
America.’”).
81 See Erin Duffin, Population Distribution in the United States in 2018, by Generation
(July
1,
2019),
https://www.statista.com/statistics/296974/us-population-share-bygeneration/ (describing the proportions of different generations in the population).
82 This is a simplified conceptual definition. There are vigorous mathematical debates
about how best to measure maximum diversity in a set. See, e.g., Katherine Vera et al., MultiObjective Maximum Diversity Problem, 2017 XLIII LATIN AM. COMP. CONF. 1 (2017).
83 See infra Part II.D (discussing cognitive diversity as an age diversity rationale).
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Earth is currently Kane Tanaka of Japan, who is only 117.84 This illustrates
that achieving maximal age diversity is best thought of as an aspirational
goal; the point is to strive for the widest range of ages in a group, given
practical constraints, as a way of accomplishing certain normative goals.
Finally, proxy diversity is an umbrella category of different types of
diversity. It arises in situations when the relevant dimension serves as a
proxy for some other characteristic of interest, and some form of diversity is
desirable in that underlying characteristic.85 This type of diversity is
valuable in situations where measuring the underlying variable is difficult
and the proxy variable has a strong relationship with the underlying variable
of interest. For example, age serves as a good proxy for a child’s social and
mental capacities at young ages.86 Schools seek an age diversity in the
classroom that falls within a narrow band, usually where most students are
aged within one year of each other. This approach can facilitate classroom
instruction and management, but it is also less costly than testing each child
annually, especially when their capacities are changing quickly. This,
however, is just one example of proxy diversity. When age is a proxy for
other characteristics, a different form of proxy diversity might emerge.87
These multiple forms of diversity illustrate that diversity is itself diverse.
It is better understood as a plural concept rather than a unitary one, and this
understanding creates a need to proceed contextually. There are many
different settings in which diversity might exist, from a small group like a
jury to a large institution like a corporation to society as a whole. The
normative justifications for diversity will also vary according to the form that
age diversity takes and the setting in which it is examined. This is the subject
of the next Part.

84 See Joshua Bote, World’s Oldest Living Person Celebrates her 117th Birthday,
Extending Record Another Year, USA TODAY (Jan. 6, 2020), https://www.usatoday.com/
story/news/world/2020/01/06/kane-tanaka-worlds-oldest-living-person-celebrates-117birthday/2824040001/ (reporting that Kane Tanaka was certified as the oldest living person
in 2019 by the Guinness Book of World Records).
85 See Michelle M. Mello & Kathryn Zeiler, Empirical Health Law Scholarship: The
State of the Field, 96 GEO. L.J. 649, 693 (2008) (describing proxies as “variables the
researchers hope are positively correlated with the true variable of interest—because data on
the variables of interest are not available or are too expensive to collect.”).
86 See Huntington, supra note 36 (describing neurological development).
87 See infra Part II.A (discussing age as a proxy for human developmental stage,
reproductive capacity, and labor force attachment).
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II. THE CASES FOR AND AGAINST AGE DIVERSITY

One scholar has noted that diversity “wears a halo and also a haze.”88
Indeed, this has been one of the major critiques of diversity as a concept—
that it means whatever you want it to mean.89 This Part will clear the haze
with respect to age diversity by disentangling and assessing the different
families of normative arguments that apply to it.90 Several of the arguments
presented here are recognizable from the racial or gender diversity contexts.
However, they may take on a different character or have different force when
applied to age diversity because of the conceptual differences between age
and other categories of identity.91 Other arguments will be unique to age and
age diversity.
The goal of this Part is not to make the case for or against age diversity
as per se good or bad. Speaking in universal terms about age diversity is not
possible, as there are many different forms it might take in various contexts.
Instead, the aim is to map out the families of normative arguments that
pertain to age diversity, or the multiple cases for and against age diversities.92
This mapping exercise will entail understanding the rationales for or against
age diversity on their own terms, rather than weighing them against other
policy interests. Properly situated decision-makers will eventually need to
engage in this balancing analysis, and it may very well be the case that in

88

BERREY, supra note 12, at 26.
See Trina Jones, The Diversity Rationale: A Problematic Solution, 1 STAN. J. CIV. RTS.
& CIV. LIBERTIES 171, 176–77 (2005) (“The concept means different things to different people
depending upon when, where, and by whom it is invoked. Thus, one can never be quite certain
of why or for what purpose diversity is being utilized or who is being benefited or harmed.”).
90 This Article focuses on instrumental rather than intrinsic arguments about age
diversity. See Patrick S. Shin, Diversity v. Colorblindness, 2009 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1175, 1182–
87 (2009) (describing the differences between intrinsic and extrinsic sources of value and
whether they are valued instrumentally or as an end). There are intrinsic arguments that one
could advance about age diversity, such as that age diversity is constitutive feature of an
institution, but such arguments would require defending a particular conception of that
institution. The aim here is to introduce the major arguments in the normative case more
broadly, rather than to address age diversity in one particular situation.
91 For instance, the historical racial injustice that undergirds some of the normative
rationales for racial diversity simply does not exist for age and age diversity. See supra text
accompanying notes 52–54. Thus, the arguments here will tend to be more forward-looking—
thinking about what benefits and costs age diversity has in the present going forward—rather
than thinking of age diversity as a vehicle to redress past injustice. See Devon W. Carbado &
Mitu Gulati, What Exactly Is Racial Diversity?, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1149, 1152 (2003)
(distinguishing between backward-looking and forward-looking justifications for racial
diversity). See also supra text accompanying notes 33–34 (discussing the differences between
age and other categories).
92 One might ask why homogeneity is being used as an objective baseline against which
diversity has to “prove itself.” See Evan P. Apfelbaum et al., Rethinking the Baseline in
Diversity Research: Should We Be Explaining the Effects of Homogeneity?, 9 PSYCHOL. SCI.
235, 242 (2014) (suggesting that “it may also be informative to consider what homogeneity
takes away or even what biases diversity disrupts.”).
89
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some instances other policy interests will trump the interest in age diversity
of a certain type. In order to understand how to weigh age diversity interests
against other policy interests, however, one must first understand them on
their own. That understanding is the aim of this Part.
The normative arguments presented here are organized roughly based on
the size of the group to which they might apply. Thus, the first Section
addresses age diversity in the largest unit of analysis: society.
A. Demography
The largest group for which age diversity might be relevant is society as
a whole. 93 But what is the ideal age diversity for society? As an initial
matter, all societies need some basic level of age heterogeneity for biological
reasons. A society composed entirely of 1-year-olds would not survive, as
the infants would not be able to care for themselves.94 Similarly, a society
composed entirely of 100-year-olds would also not be self-sustaining, as the
population would lack the capacity for biological reproduction.95 Beyond
the biological imperative, a broader age diversity in a given society is also
helpful for cultural propagation. Those who are in the older reaches of the
human lifespan represent a social resource of memory and cultural traditions,
and they can transmit these social resources to younger generations,
particularly within the family context.96
In assessing whether or not societal age diversity is normatively
desirable, age often serves as a proxy for some other characteristic of
interest.97 Thus, it is not diversity in ages per se that is important, but

93 See JENNIFER HICKES LUNDQUIST ET AL., DEMOGRAPHY: THE STUDY OF THE HUMAN
POPULATION 93 (4th ed. 2015) (“The most important dimensions of [population] composition,
indisputably, are age and sex.”).
94 See Martha Albertson Fineman, Cracking the Foundational Myths: Independence,
Autonomy, and Self-Sufficiency, 8 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 13, 19 (1999) (“Without
aggregate caretaking, there could be no society, so we might say that it is caretaking labor that
produces and reproduces society.”).
95 See Rebecca Tan & Tania Duffa, This 74-Year Old Woman Just Gave Birth to Twins,
WASH. POST (Sep. 6, 2019) (describing Mangayamma Yaramati as the oldest woman to give
birth at 74, though doing so with assistive reproductive technologies). Beyond this basic age
diversity needed to propagate society, further age diversity is also attractive to the extent that
it represents scientific advances in longevity. However, in order to prevent the normative
question of societal age diversity from collapsing into the question whether extending life
indefinitely is achievable or desirable, we can assume that there is some set maximum human
lifespan. See Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Live Long—and Prosper?, 45 JURIMETRICS J. 355, 357
(2005) (“[M]aximum lifespan, the longest time that any humans live, has not advanced much
if one discounts Biblical stories of people living for several centuries.”).
96 See Jessica Dixon Weaver, Grandma in the White House: Legal Support for
Intergenerational Caregiving, 43 SETON HALL L. REV. 1, 16 (2013) (“Grandparents often take
on the responsibility of passing down family and cultural history to their grandchildren, which
can play a large part in establishing the identity of children.”).
97 See text accompanying notes 85–87.
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diversity in the underlying characteristic for which age stands in. In the
above examples, age stands in for human development, reproductive
capacity, and accumulated experience, for which age is an excellent proxy.98
Age also indicates one’s position on the lifecourse within a particular cultural
context.99 Thus, increased age diversity means that a society will have a
range of individuals who are at different locations on the standardized
lifecourse. But which array of life stages and their associated behaviors is
normatively attractive? The field of demography provides some guidance
on this question.
Demographers have described how the age composition of a population
can present unique opportunities or challenges. For example, lower-income
countries often possess an age population structure with large numbers of
youth and relatively fewer older adults.100 These youth are dependent on
others in a variety of ways until they themselves become productive
members of society, and this period of youth dependency may produce
economic strains.101 In contrast, upper-income countries tend to exhibit
aging populations, with more similar numbers of youth and adults.102 This
is primarily due to declining fertility rates and the natural consequence of
smaller cohorts of young people.103 This poses its own problems. To the
extent that older individuals exit the workforce and are supported by public
or familial resources, such a situation may create similar economic strains as
a society that is mostly composed of youth.104
This points to a certain form of age diversity that is particularly attractive
at the societal level. Specifically, the age structure should contain a large
number of individuals occupying life stages in which they are economically
productive. More upper-income countries have in fact already reaped this
“demographic dividend” in the mid-twentieth century when a large bulge in
the population structure—the Baby Boom Generation—reached productive
working ages.105 The presence of a large number of working-age individuals

98 See FREDERICK SCHAUER, PROFILES, PROBABILITIES, AND STEREOTYPES 129–30 (2003)
(arguing for the use of age as a proxy in circumstances where it has predictive power).
99 See supra text accompanying notes 43–45.
100 See LUNDQUIST ET AL., supra note 93, at 100 (showing various population pyramids).
101 See id. at 117 (“Youth dependency can be a drain on per-capita wealth in [less
developed regions].”). Youthful life stages are also associated with increased sexual behavior
and criminal activity, which can pose problems for public health and safety. See, e.g., KARL
DEHNE & GABRIELE RIEDNER, SEXUALLY TRANSMITTED INFECTIONS AMONG ADOLESCENTS 7–
10 (2005) (describing the costs associated with adolescent sexuality)
102 See LUNDQUIST ET AL., supra note 93, at 119 (“[More developed regions’] population
pyramids are almost columnar in shape and are projected to be even more so in the future.”).
103 See id. at 114 (describing how declining fertility contributes to an aging population).
104 See GEORGE MAGNUS, THE AGE OF AGING: HOW DEMOGRAPHICS ARE CHANGING THE
GLOBAL ECONOMY AND OUR WORLD xxiii (2009) (“Western countries . . . have completed the
decline in youth dependency and now face a rapid increase in old-age dependency.”).
105 See James N. Gribble & Jason Bremner, Achieving a Demographic Dividend, 67 POP.
BULL. 1, 1 (2012) (“The demographic dividend refers to the accelerated economic growth that
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as compared to dependent youth and older adults minimizes the age
dependency ratio, or the ratio of working age individuals to non-working age
individuals.106 The specific form that this ideal age diversity takes will vary
based on the cultural context in question, as the range of ages that could be
considered working age will vary by country.107 For example, it is more
common for individuals in their early teens to join the labor market in more
agrarian societies, while other societies more strictly regulate working ages
through child labor and mandatory retirement laws.108 As will be explored
in the next Part, immigration law is one of the major policy levers available
to address societal age diversity.109
B. Distributive Justice
Age diversity might also impact issues relevant to society as a whole
through its relationship to distributive justice, which concerns the fair
allocation of benefits and burdens in society.110 Depending on the theory of
distributive justice to which one subscribes, a different composition of
individuals in various societal institutions will be consistent with fairer
allocations of societal goods.111 Each theory will likely prescribe a slightly
different form of diversity as a normative ideal, but the goal of this Section
is not to describe what every theory of distributive justice would require visà-vis age diversity. Instead, the more modest goal is to illustrate how such
arguments might function and how age might complicate them, using
egalitarianism as an instructive example.
begins with changes in the age structure of a country's population as it transitions from high
to low birth and death rates.”).
106 See Age-Dependency Ratio, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUB. HEALTH 23 (Wilhelm Kirch ed.,
2008) (“The age-dependency ratio is a summary measure of age composition in a population
that incorporates specific assumptions about ‘productive’ and ‘unproductive’ groups. Agedependency ratios represent the relative numbers of dependents to supporters in the
population.”).
107 See WILSON, supra note 70, at 31 (“[C]ultural views of age, and particularly old age,
vary across the world and change over time.”).
108 See CATHRYNE L. SCHMITZ ET AL., CHILD LABOR: A GLOBAL VIEW 5 (2004) (“Child
labor rates are higher in rural areas, where the work is predominantly agrarian”); Juliane
Massarelli, The Origins of Retirement, 17 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 111, 111–12 (2003)
(discussing the origins of mandatory retirement laws); Bruce Goldstein et al., Enforcing Fair
Labor Standards in the Modern American Sweatshop: Rediscovering the Statutory Definition
of Employment, 46 UCLA L. REV. 983, 1069–75 (1999) (discussing the history of child labor
laws);
109 See infra Part III.B.1.
110 See Alexander A. Boni-Saenz, Distributive Justice and Donative Intent, 65 UCLA L.
Rev. 324, 346 (2018) (“The first question for any distributive analysis is what good is being
distributed, and all goods can typically be conceptualized as either benefits or burdens.”).
111 See Anita Bernstein, Diversity May Be Justified, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 201, 227 (2012)
(“Understood in terms of corrective and distributive justice, diversity is more of an outcome
than a goal.”).
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Egalitarian theories posit generally that welfare should be distributed in
a more or less equal fashion across members of society.112 Thus, all other
things being equal, an egalitarian might prefer something approximating
mirror diversity in important societal institutions because it would represent
outcomes roughly consistent with equality of opportunity or resources.113
For example, most egalitarians would cheer the inclusion of more women
and people of color in high-status professions and public institutions as
compared to the past.114 These increasingly diversified spaces offer the
promise of a fairer allocation of job opportunities and political power than
historically, when individuals were more routinely excluded from such
groups on the basis of sex, race, or both.115
An age diversity that mirrors the general population would at first glance
seem to represent an outcome consistent with equality as well. However, the
relative lack of certain age groups in societal institutions does not necessarily
indicate an unequal distribution of welfare more generally.116 While the lack
of age diversity in a given institution may represent a temporary inequality
between two individuals at one point in time, this inequality will often even
out across the lives of those two individuals.117 For example, while eighteenyear-olds are prohibited from serving in the United States Senate, making it
less age diverse, they will eventually have the opportunity to do so once they
reach the age of thirty, the same as everyone else.118 Similarly, eighty-yearolds are not well-represented in the workplace, making it less age diverse,
but if they had the opportunity to work in the past, they may have had a
similar distribution of job opportunities over their lifetimes when compared
See IWAO HIROSE, EGALITARIANISM 1 (2015) (“Egalitarianism: a class of distributive
principles, which claim that individuals should have equal quantities of well-being or morally
relevant factors that affect their life.”).
113 See David Orentlicher, Diversity: A Fundamental American Principle, 70 MO. L. REV.
777, 811 (2005) (“To be sure, the absence of diversity in education, employment or public
office does not always reflect an absence of opportunity. . . . However, the absence of diverse
participation in many positions provides a strong indicator of an absence of fair
opportunity.”).
114 See, e.g., Deborah L. Rhode, From Platitudes to Priorities: Diversity and Gender
Equity in Law Firms, 24 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1041, 1042–46 (2011) (noting some progress
but still a troubling lack of racial and gender diversity in law firms).
115 See JOSEPH FISHKIN, BOTTLENECKS: A NEW THEORY OF EQUAL OPPORTUNITY 232
(2014) (describing various identity characteristics as bottlenecks to equality of opportunity)
116 See Alexander A. Boni-Saenz, Age, Equality, and Vulnerability, 21 THEORETICAL
INQUIRIES L. 161, 171–74 (2020) (describing how age and the temporal questions it raises
complicate equality analyses).
117 See Boni-Saenz, supra note 33, at 872–75 (describing why the lifetimes of individuals
are the relevant temporal units of analysis). See also LARRY S. TEMKIN, INEQUALITY 233
(1993) (“[O]n a complete lives view, an egalitarian should be concerned about A's being
worse off than B to the extent, and only to the extent, that A's life, taken as a complete whole,
is worse than B's, taken as a complete whole.”).
118 See U.S. Const. art I, § 3(“No Person shall be a Senator who shall not have attained
to the Age of thirty Years”).
112
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to younger individuals.119 Thus, the universal nature of the aging process
helps to ensure equality across age groups, provided that age-based
entitlements and encumbrances are consistent over time.120
Sometimes, however, this requirement of consistency is not met for a
specific age cohort.121 If a particular generation has experienced a dearth of
opportunities or a disproportionate set of burdens due to negative events
occurring at an inopportune time, then the presence of members of that
disadvantaged generation in societal institutions may serve distributive
justice goals by remedying that preexisting inequality.122 For example, some
might argue that Millennials have been disadvantaged by the Great
Recession striking in 2008 when many of them were first entering the
workforce, followed now by the economic contraction caused by the
COVID-19 pandemic.123 This converts an argument for age diversity more
broadly into an argument for cohort diversity in a particular setting.124 The
empirics of such a cohort-based argument can be tricky, as they require
projecting out into the future what the likely lifetime welfare of a particular
generation might be, but such an argument may be more likely to succeed
than one based on age group equality.
Thus, as the egalitarian example demonstrates, there may exist
distributive justice arguments for certain forms of age diversity, but such
arguments will need to contend with the temporal nature of age and provide
a sound empirical basis for their premises. The next Section explores why
the presence of individuals of different ages in societal institutions may be
normatively desirable or undesirable for reasons of recognition, rather than
distribution.125

119 See U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Labor Force Statistics from the Current
Population Survey, https://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaat18b.htm (noting the relatively few
workers aged above 65 in various industries).
120 See Boni-Saenz, supra note 33, at 882 (“From an egalitarian perspective, time serves
to cure the negative effects of the discrimination.”).
121 See supra text accompanying notes 41–49 (describing the differences between age
groups and cohorts).
122 See Boni-Saenz, supra note 33, at 886 (describing how contextual factors can lead to
lifetime inequalities despite equal treatment over the lifecourse).
123 See, e.g., Verónica C. Gonzales-Zamora, Give Me Liberty, or Give Me Breath: A Call
for Economic Justice, J. LEGAL EDUC. (forthcoming 2020) (describing the pivotal events that
have placed Millennials in complicated position); Alexis Madrigal, Why Housing Policy Feels
Like Generational Warfare, To Millennials at Least, THE ATLANTIC (June 13, 2019) (noting
how home ownership opportunities differ significantly by generation).
124 See Juliana Bidadanure, Better Procedures for Fairer Outcomes: Can Youth Quotas
Increase our Chances of Meeting the Demands of Intergenerational Justice?, in YOUTH
QUOTAS AND OTHER FORMS OF YOUTH PARTICIPATION IN AGEING SOCIETIES 37, 51–54 (Jörg
Tremmel et al. eds., 2015) (disentangling age- and cohort-based rationales).
125 See NANCY FRASER, JUSTICE INTERRUPTUS: CRITICAL REFLECTIONS ON THE
“POSTSOCIALIST” CONDITION 13–14 (1997) (contrasting issues of distribution and
recognition).
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C. Representation

Age diversity can serve to advance the representation of individuals of
various ages in societal institutions. To the extent that they have force,
representation arguments support an institutional age composition that
mirrors a reference population, often the adult population, rather than
minimizing or maximizing age diversity or seeking some other configuration
of ages.126 These arguments have particular power in the context of public
institutions or institutions that are accorded high social status, as these hold
special expressive significance.127
In analyzing representation arguments, it is important to first distinguish
between two forms of representation: descriptive and substantive.
Descriptive representation is representation that
depends on the representative’s characteristics, on what he is or is
like, on being something rather than doing something. The
representative does not act for others; he “stands for them, by
virtue of a correspondence or connection between them, a
resemblance or reflection.”128
Thus, an individual serves as a representative merely by having some
relevant characteristic in common with those that she represents. In the
context of this article, that characteristic is age. In contrast, substantive
representation is “representation as an acting for others, an activity in behalf
of, in the interest of, as the agent of, someone else.”129 This form of
representation is more concerned with the interests of those who are
represented and whether the representative is acting to advance those
interests, similar to the understanding adopted by agency law.130 The
descriptive representation that mirror age diversity provides has the potential
126

While the various legal rules that demarcate the separation between childhood and
adulthood also affect age diversity, they are not this Article’s focus, and I assume for the
purposes of this Article that some of these rules are necessary for other policy reasons. See
Jonathan Todres, Maturity, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 1107, 1118–45 (2012) (discussing rationales for
maturity rules).
127 See Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021,
2025–28 (1996) (discussing the expressive power of law and social norms).
128 See HANNA FENICHEL PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 61 (1967). The
normative power of descriptive representation derives at least in part from the importance of
the politics of recognition. See Charles Taylor, The Politics of Recognition, in
MULTICULTURALISM 25, 25 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1994) (“[O]ur identity is partly shaped by
recognition or its absence, . . . and so a person or group of people can suffer real damage, real
distortion, if the people or society around them mirror back to them a confining or demeaning
or contemptible picture of themselves.”).
129 See id. at 113.
130 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (2006) (“Agency is the fiduciary
relationship that arises when one person (a ‘principal’) manifests assent to another person (an
“agent”) that the agent shall act on the principal's behalf”).
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to provide psychological, social, and institutional benefits, though these will
likely be more modest than those provided by representation on the basis of
race or sex. In addition, age-based descriptive representation may also
contribute to or hinder substantive representation.
On a psychological level, descriptive representation ensures that
individuals from all relevant groups have role models.131 While all segments
of the population benefit from role models, they will be especially important
if a particular group lacks representation in a particular field.132 For example,
part of what makes Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez compelling to so many
Democratic voters is that she is particularly young, in addition to being a
woman of color. Millennials who are near her age may see themselves in
her and thus might be more likely to see a career in politics as a possibility.133
The importance of the intersection of age with race and gender is significant
here. Given demographic trends, role models who possess a racial minority
status are more likely to come from younger cohorts.134 In addition, in the
institutions in which older males are overrepresented relative to the general
population, shifting towards mirror diversity would open up opportunities
for participation for other groups, such as women.135 As a result, aiming for
mirror age diversity may be an effective way to provide racial and gender
role models as well.
However, there are reasons to think that the role model effect might be
more muted with age than with other identity characteristics. It is easier to
imagine oneself as older or younger as compared to being a person of a
different race or sex.136 For younger individuals in particular, an older role

131 See Randall Kennedy, Persuasion and Distrust: A Comment on the Affirmative Action
Debate, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1327, 1329 (1986) (arguing for affirmative action because “the
expansion of a professional class [passes] elevated aspirations to subsequent generations.”).
But see Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 275–76 (1986) (rejecting the role
model rationale as sufficient to withstand an Equal Protection challenge); Richard Delgado,
Affirmative Action As A Majoritarian Device: Or, Do You Really Want to Be A Role Model?,
89 MICH. L. REV. 1222, 1226–27 (1991) (critiquing the role model argument).
132 See Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1557–58 (2005)
(discussing how role models from subordinated groups can reduce implicit bias).
133 See Edward M. Chen, The Judiciary, Diversity, and Justice for All, 91 CAL. L. REV.
1109, 1116 (2003) (“[D]iversity provides role models for those historically excluded. It can
provide a source of hope and inspiration for those who would otherwise limit their horizons
and aspirations.”).
134 See supra text accompanying notes 71–73.
135 See Shane Goldmacher & Jonathan Martin, Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez Defeats Joseph
Crowley in Major Democratic House Upset, N.Y. TIMES (June 26, 2018) (noting that OcasioCortez defeated a 56-year old white male incumbent running “as a woman, as a young person,
as a working-class champion, as an unabashed liberal and as a person of color.”).
136 See Adeno Addis, Role Models and the Politics of Recognition, 144 U. PA. L. REV.
1377, 1435–40 (1996) (exploring the case for race-specific role modeling); Berenice Fisher,
Wandering in the Wilderness: The Search for Women Role Models, 13 SIGNS 211, 212–14
(1988) (discussing the value of female role models to women).
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model can represent one’s future.137 Since role models are often futureoriented—who we want to become—for many it might suffice to see
someone who is older and shares some other identity characteristics.
Conversely, older individuals may not see younger individuals as role
models in the same way, as youth is in their past. However, they may derive
a different psychological benefit from seeing younger individuals who
remind them of their past selves, for instance if it is connected with the
practice of reminiscence.138
Relatedly, descriptive representation on the basis of age promotes the
value of social equality more broadly.139 This value is realized when
everyone in society is seen as worthy of respect and there are no social
hierarchies that serve to place one person in a dominant or subordinate
position relative to another.140 Age diversity, like other forms of diversity,
can help to promote this ideal because the representation of people of various
types in societal institutions sends the message that these institutions are
open to all. In the context of age diversity, it demonstrates that one’s age
alone need not be a barrier to one’s participation or membership.141 Within
those institutions, the presence of people of different ages can also create
social solidarity and foster a feeling of social connectedness across
generations.142
The descriptive representation that age diversity provides creates
benefits to the institutions that are age diverse as well. Individuals are more
likely to see an institution as legitimate if they feel as if they are present in
those institutions by virtue of their descriptive representatives.143 It can also
foster attachments between people and those institutions, and forming these
attachments at an early age is important to sustain those institutions in the

137 See JENNIFER RADDEN, DIVIDED MINDS AND SUCCESSIVE SELVES 25–31 (1996)
(conceptualizing the self as continuous through time).
138 See Ernst Bohlmeijer et al., The Effects of Reminiscence on Psychological Well-Being
in Older Adults: A Meta-Analysis, 11 AGING & MENTAL HEALTH 291, 297 (2007) (finding
that “reminiscence interventions have moderate effects on life-satisfaction and emotional
well-being of older adults”).
139 See IRIS MANION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 191 (1990)
(“Attending to group specific needs and providing for group representation both promotes
that social equality and provides the recognition that undermines cultural imperialism.”).
140 See Samuel Scheffler, The Practice of Equality, in SOCIAL EQUALITY: ON WHAT IT
MEANS TO BE EQUALS 21, 21–22 (Carina Fourie et al., eds., 2015) (understanding social
equality as relational in nature).
141 See FISHKIN, supra note 115, at 13 (describing bottlenecks as “a narrow place in the
opportunity structure through which one must pass in order to successfully pursue a wide
range of valued goals”).
142 See Danielle Allen, Toward a Connected Society, in Lewis & Cantor supra note 63,
at 71, 87–88 (arguing for a socially connected and egalitarian society in which institutions
actively foster bridging ties across demographic difference).
143 See LANI GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY: FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS IN
REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY 35 (1994) (describing the importance of this type of virtual
representation).
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future.144 This type of social legitimacy and attachment is vital in the realm
of politics so that all age groups feel engaged with the electoral and ruling
processes rather than socially excluded.145 This reasoning is likely what led
the Democratic Party to institute age quotas for delegates to the 1972
Democratic Convention.146 The 1968 Democratic Convention was widely
seen as a debacle, as various groups, including youth, protested outside. The
lesson learned was that it was better to have those individuals represented
inside the building.147
In addition to these direct effects of age-based descriptive representation,
this form of representation may also help facilitate substantive representation
if certain conditions are met.148 There must first be some relationship
between age and the political interests that one might possess. As a matter
of public opinion, there are certainly generational differences in political
ideology.149 In addition, societal resources and legal entitlements are often
allocated at least in part according to age, creating different age-based
political interests in them.150
The second condition is the existence of some barrier that prevents
people of one age from effectively representing the interests of individuals
of other ages.151 There are two plausible barriers to this cross-age
representation. The first is a breakdown in communication between

144

See Juliana Bidadanure, supra note 124, at 50 (describing how youth quotas could
promote “feelings of inclusion and help in reengaging young people in their political
communities.”).
145 See Martha L. Minow, From Class Actions to Miss Saigon: The Concept of
Representation in the Law, 39 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 269, 291 (1991) (noting how representation
can promote “apparent legitimacy”). It will also be important to a lesser extent in private
institutions. For instance, it may valuable for groups such as attorneys to be representative of
the public at large to engender trust in them across demographic groups. See J. Cunyon
Gordon, Painting by Numbers: “And, Um, Let’s Have A Black Lawyer Sit at Our Table”, 71
FORDHAM L. REV. 1257, 1268 (2003) (describing the importance of legitimacy across
demographic groups in the legal profession).
146 See Robert E. Goodin, Convention Quotas and Communal Representation, 7 BRIT. J.
POL. SCI. 255, 255 (1977) (describing the various quotas put in place for the 1972 Democratic
Convention).
147 See id.
148 See Jane Mansbridge, Should Blacks Represent Blacks and Women Represent
Women? A Contingent “Yes”, 61 J. POL. 628, 641–48 (1999) (describing the two contexts in
which descriptive representation enhances substantive representation as being in contexts of
uncrystallized interests and contexts of distrust).
149 See Lydia Saad, Socialism as Popular as Capitalism Among Young Adults, GALLUP
(November 29, 2019), https://news.gallup.com/poll/268766/socialism-popular-capitalismamong-young-adults.aspx (contrasting the positive views towards socialism held by younger
generations as compared with older ones).
150 See supra text accompany note 45.
151 See Mansbridge, supra note 148, at 641 (“In conditions of impaired communication,
including impairment caused by inattention and distrust, the shared experience imperfectly
captured by descriptive representation facilitates vertical communication between
representatives and constituents.”).
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members of generations such that the interests of one generation are not
adequately understood or considered by the other.152 Youth activists
believed this to be the case in the 1960s, when activist Jack Weinberg of the
Free Speech Movement coined the phrase “Don’t trust anybody over
thirty.”153 We may be entering another period of intergenerational conflict
and misunderstanding between those Baby Boomer activists of the 1960s,
now grown up and in positions of political power, and the younger
generations of Millennials and Generation Z.154 In such circumstances,
including descriptive representatives from younger cohorts might reduce the
harm to the deliberative process created by the lack of age diversity in
various representative bodies.155
A second possible barrier arises when there is an age-based difference in
political interests grounded in the time horizons for certain political issues.156
Consider climate change, which requires actions that often involve shortterm costs but long-term benefits. A carbon tax would increase the costs of
carbon-based activities in the present while averting costs associated with
climate change that will occur in the future.157 Older individuals have little
individual incentive to tackle such issues because they will only see only the
costs and none of the benefits, though those with loved ones in younger
generations may still feel some personal stake. In contrast, younger
individuals will experience the future costs of inaction directly and thus
might be more willing to accept costs in the present. This argument assumes
a troubling lack of altruism, but if the factual predicates contain some truth,
then younger representatives will be more likely to represent the interests of
those who will experience the consequences of these types of decisions.

152 See ANGIE WILLIAMS & JON F. NUSSBAUM, INTERGENERATIONAL COMMUNICATION
ACROSS THE LIFESPAN 26–45 (2012) (discussing the contexts and barriers across generations).
153 See SETH ROSENFELD, SUBVERSIVES: THE FBI’S WAR ON STUDENT RADICALS, AND
REAGAN’S RISE TO POWER 214 (2012) (attributing the quote to Jack Weinberg in response to
a reporter who insinuated that the Free Speech movement was backed by communists).
154 See JENNIE BRISTOW, BABY BOOMERS AND GENERATIONAL CONFLICT 183–84 (2015)
(“[W]hereas social or cultural critiques over the twentieth century tended to focus on divisions
of class, race, or gender, and saw problems or solutions in terms of political differences
between left and right, the recent period tends to focus on the problems allegedly caused by
the domination of one generation over another.”).
155 See Bidadanure, supra note 124, at 50 (“Another potential impact of youth quotas
could be an enhanced vertical communication between young people and [representatives].”).
156 See Anja Karnein & Dominic Roser, Saving the Planet by Empowering the Young?,
in Tremmel et al., supra note 124, 77, 89–90 (considering but questioning whether
empowering youth would lead to better environmental outcomes). Greta Thunberg, the 18year old Swedish climate change activist, illustrates this concept well in one of her speeches,
when she proclaims: “We are not the ones who are responsible for this, but we are the ones
who have to live with these consequences, and that is so incredibly unfair.” Robinson Meyer,
Why Greta Makes Adults Uncomfortable, THE ATLANTIC (Sep. 23, 2019).
157 See generally Roy Boyd et al., Taxation as a Policy Instrument to Reduce CO2
Emissions: A Net Benefit Analysis, 29 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT 1 (1995) (discussing the
economic implications of carbon taxes).
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Even if this is not the case, their presence will lend legitimacy to any
decisions that have these long-term impacts.158
Even with these positive effects on substantive representation, it is
possible that descriptive representation may also actively harm substantive
representation in the political sphere. Some research has shown that people
who share demographic characteristics with their representatives may
scrutinize them less, assuming that they are acting in their interests even
when they might not be.159 Conversely, people who do not share
demographic characteristics with their representatives can become
politically demotivated, believing their interests and concerns will not matter
to a demographically-different representative.160 This illustrates how it
might be dangerous to embrace too strong a link between age and interests—
a form of age essentialism—as it may have detrimental psychological
effects.
While representation rationales apply primarily, though not exclusively,
to public institutions, the next set of considerations apply to any group, as
they deal with how age diversity may affect group outcomes more broadly,
for good or ill.
D. Group Efficacy
Groups often come together to solve problems, and this Section
considers how age diversity might help or hinder in accomplishing this
objective.161 Age diversity will help if it increases the cognitive diversity in
the group and stimulates group processes that elicit that cognitive diversity
in group decision-making.162 In contrast to representation claims, these
158 See Ivo Walliman-Helmer, Can Youth Quotas Help Avoid Future Disasters?, in
Tremmel, supra note 124, at 57, 70–73 (doubting whether youth representatives would
enhance long-term planning but acknowledging that their presence would increase the
legitimacy of long-term policy decisions).
159 See CAROL M. SWAIN, BLACK FACES, BLACK INTERESTS: THE REPRESENTATION OF
AFRICAN AMERICANS IN CONGRESS 73 (1993) (quoting one Black Representative as saying:
“One of the advantages, and disadvantages, of representing blacks is their shameless loyalty
to their incumbents. You can almost get away with raping babies and be forgiven. You don’t
have any vigilance about your performance”).
160 See Claudine Gay, The Effect of Black Congressional Representation on Political
Participation, 95 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 589, 598–99 (2001) (finding that white constituents are
less politically engaged in districts with black representatives).
161 See Julie Christian et al., Workplace Diversity and Group Relations: An Overview, 9
GROUP PROCESSES. & INTERGROUP REL. 459, 460 (2006) (“[W]e can conclude that diversity—
mixed composition workgroups—can improve group performance by providing groups with
a wider range of perspectives and a broader skills base, but simultaneously it can be
detrimental to group cohesion and performance because the diversity in personal backgrounds
has the potential to exert a negative influence.”).
162 See SCOTT E. PAGE, THE DIVERSITY BONUS 13 (2017) (“[A] team’s performance
depends on the diversity as well as the ability of its members. . . . The best team will not
consist of the “best” individuals. It consists of diverse thinkers.”); Anthony Carnevale &
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arguments favor maximal age diversity in a given group rather than aiming
for diversity corresponding to a reference population.163 However, maximal
age diversity might also hinder group efficacy if age differences among
group members lead to social conflict.164 This Section will explore each of
these sets of arguments in general, examine how they might apply to age
diversity in particular, and review the mixed empirical evidence on them.
The basic cognitive diversity argument for age diversity is familiar from
other diversity contexts, and it has two basic components.165 First, including
diverse perspectives—i.e. cognitive diversity—in groups will enhance group
outcomes. Second, identity diversity, including age diversity, will contribute
to the cognitive diversity in a group. Cognitive diversity exists when
individuals in a group have diverse cognitive repertoires, or sets of
“information, knowledge, heuristics or tools, representations, and mental
models and frameworks.”166 Diverse perspectives within groups allow teams
to cover more cognitive ground overall by having access to the widest variety
of information, knowledge, and frameworks.167 Empirical studies about the
effectiveness of cognitively diverse teams support this proposition.168 These

Nicole Smith, The Economic Value of Diversity, in Lewis & Cantor, supra note 63, at 106,
120 (“Diverse perspectives can spring from many sources, including education, work and life
experience, and personal identity.”). This raises the difficult question of which forms of
identity diversity to prioritize as a general matter, which I bracket for the discussion here.
163 See text accompanying notes 82–84 (describing maximal diversity).
164 See PETER H. SCHUCK, DIVERSITY IN AMERICA 40 (2003) (“The dismal trail of
hostility, fear, violence, and social upheaval aroused by ethnic, religious, racial, and other
diversities is a very long. The trail leads today from Sri Lanka, Rwanda, the Balkans, the
Mideast, and many other dangerous neighborhoods back to the earliest human
communities.”); Robert D. Putnam, E Pluribus Unum: Diversity and Community in the
Twenty-First Century, 30 SCANDINAVIAN POL. STUD. 137, 138–39 (2007) (worrying that racial
and ethnic diversity might lead to decreased social solidarity). Age diversity is not part of
this checkered history, perhaps because age-based conflicts would require people to turn on
their own families. However, age differences may still harm group cohesion in smaller
groups.
See David Leonhardt, Old vs. Young, N.Y. TIMES (June 22, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/24/opinion/sunday/the-generation-gap-is-back.html
(noting intergenerational tension with respect to political beliefs, economic opportunities, and
social practices).
165 See RANDALL KENNEDY, FOR DISCRIMINATION: RACE, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, AND THE
LAW 94 (2013) (“Devotees of diversity argue that teaching, learning, and decision making
will typically be richer, more informed, and better received if a wide array of people affiliated
with salient social groupings participate together in carrying out the missions of the nation’s
schools, workplaces, and governments.”).
166 PAGE, supra note 162, at 52 (emphasis removed).
167 See Lu Hong & Scott E. Page, Groups of Diverse Problem Solvers Can Outperform
Groups of High-Ability Problem Solvers, 101 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 16385, 16386–87
(2004) (providing a mathematical model and computational test of this proposition).
168 See PAGE, supra note 162, at 171–82 (collecting empirical studies); Seyhan Güver &
Renate Motschnig, Effects of Diversity in Teams and Workgroups: A Qualitative Systematic
Analysis, 7 INT’L J. BUS., HUM., & TECH. 6, 15 (2017) (conducting a systematic analysis of
studies from 1959-2016 and finding that diversity has a positive impact on creativity and
innovation); Karen A. Jehn et al., Why Differences Make a Difference: A Field Study of
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diverse cognitive repertoires are particularly useful for groups tackling
complex cognitive problems, which are increasingly important in our
knowledge economy.169
Identity diversity contributes to cognitive diversity because identity
characteristics affect one’s experiences, and these experiences, in turn, cause
individuals to develop different cognitive tools.170 Social psychologists have
demonstrated cross-cultural differences in cognitive mapping, as individuals
from different cultures notice different features of situations and understand
them differently.171 This is not to say that identity diversity will always
contribute cognitive diversity to a group, nor that the cognitive diversity will
in all instances be helpful. Identity-based diversity is most likely to be
beneficial when tackling cognitive problems in which there is a significant
human element, such as appear in the fields of education, finance,
entertainment, or health.172 It is less likely that one’s identity characteristics
will add to one’s cognitive toolset in a way that will enhance a team’s ability
to handle scientific or technical problems, although there are examples of
this as well.173 Thus, a marketing firm trying to find ways of making certain
products appealing will be more likely to benefit from the identity-based
cognitive diversity than theoretical physicists trying to understand the nature
of a quark.
Age diversity will contribute to cognitive diversity in a group to the
extent that age contributes to one’s cognitive toolset, and that cognitive
diversity will be helpful to the extent that it bears on the problems that a

Diversity, Conflict, and Performance in Workgroups, 44 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 741, 758 (1999)
(finding the most effective teams have high information diversity).
169 See David H. Autor et al., The Skill Content of Recent Technological Change: An
Empirical Exploration, 118 Q. J. ECON. 1279, 1322 (2003) (describing how computer
technology is replacing humans for routine tasks but not for tasks requiring creativity,
problem-solving, and communication).
170 See SCOTT E. PAGE, THE DIFFERENCE 307 (2008) (“Though identity matters, we
cannot equate individual tools or collections of tools with specific identities. We can expect,
however, that identity differences lead to experiential differences that in turn create tool
differences.”).
171 See generally RICHARD E. NISBETT, THE GEOGRAPHY OF THOUGHT: HOW ASIANS AND
WESTERNERS THINK DIFFERENTLY. . . AND WHY (2003) (describing differences in cognition
across cultures).
172 See PAGE, supra note 162, at 151 (“As a rule, we should expect identity-driven
differences to matter in any domain that serves people: education, finance, entertainment, or
health.”); Chad Sparber, Racial Diversity and Aggregate Productivity in U.S. Industries,
1980-2000, 75 SOUTHERN ECON. J. 829, 848–50 (2009) (demonstrating productivity gains
from racial diversity in sectors employing creative decision makers, while other sectors may
demonstrate productivity losses).
173 See, e.g., Emily Martin, The Egg and the Sperm: How Science has Constructed a
Romance Based on Stereotypical Male-Female Roles, 16 SIGNS 485, 486–92 (1991)
(describing how stereotypical thinking about sex roles created an inaccurate scientific account
of the interaction between egg and sperm).
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particular group is trying to solve.174 As noted earlier, age is associated with
different types of cognitive functioning and also affects one’s experiences in
a way that might generate different cognitive toolsets.175 Individuals of
different ages are exposed to different historical moments at formative times,
internalize different cultural trends, and are more likely to exhibit fluid or
crystallized intelligence. For example, different generations have distinctive
histories interfacing with technology that might provide insights for a
company that is creating new technologies that will be easy for customers to
adopt and use.176 Again, this is not to suggest that all people of a certain age
think in the same way or have the same cognitive toolset. But age is still
influential, even if the ways in which it exerts its influence are in large part
social and historical rather than essential.
While identity diversity, including age diversity, likely brings some form
of cognitive diversity to the table, the presence of socially salient differences
also trigger certain group processes that activate the cognitive diversity in a
group.177 Salient differences in a group prime individuals to believe that
difference of opinion might be present and to seek it out.178 For example, in
a study comparing homogeneous and racially diverse juries, the white
members of the racially diverse juries were more likely to highlight novel
facts and accurately characterize the facts of the case during deliberations

See PAGE, supra note 170, at 306 (“Attributes such as race shape our experiences.
They limit, steer, and even guide our choices. Thus, identity attributes cause us to construct
different sets of cognitive tools. Sometimes these are not chosen so much as forced on us.”).
175 See supra text accompanying notes 41–48. See also Saad, supra note 149 (discussing
the differing political views of younger and older generations).
176 See Emily A. Vogels, Millennials Stand Out for Their Technology Use, But Older
Generations Also Embrace Digital Life, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Sept. 9, 2019),
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/09/09/us-generations-technology-use/
(demonstrating the differing embraces of digital life by different generations); Marie Hayes
et al., Understanding Facebook Use and the Psychological Affects of Use Across Generations,
49 COMPUTERS. IN HUM. BEHAVIOR 507, 510 (2015) (explaining the different emotional
attachments generations have to social media).
177 See Katherine W. Phillips et al., The Value of Diversity in Organizations: A Social
Psychological Perspective, in SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY AND ORGANIZATIONS 253, 261 (David de
Cremer et al. eds., 2011) (“The benefits of diversity are not just in the congruence of
informational diversity and social category diversity, but extend to how diversity influences
the social interactions of those involved as well.”).
178 See Katherine W. Phillips, What is the Real Value of Diversity in Organizations?
Questioning our Assumptions, in PAGE, supra note 162, at 223, 230 (“A second benefit of
identity diversity is simply that seeing differences on the surface makes people assume that
there are more cognitive differences there in the group, prompting them to seek them out.”).
This difference need not be identity-based, as studies have tested both racial differences and
differences in education. See, e.g., Katherine W. Phillips et al., Surface-Level Diversity and
Decision-Making in Groups: When Does Deep-Level Similarity Help?, 9 GROUP PROCESSES
& INTERGROUP REL. 467, 472–73 (2006) (using those who appear Caucasian and a group
member who does not); Katherine W. Phillips & Denise Lewin Lloyd, When Surface and
Deep-Level Diversity Collide: The Effects on Dissenting Group Members, 99 ORG. BEH. &
HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 143, 147 (2006) (using medical and MBA students).
174
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than white members on the homogeneous juries.179 The presence of socially
salient identity diversity thus may trigger mental orientations that prevent the
main pathology of homogeneity in groups, which is groupthink, or the
tendency for groups to reach a premature consensus through the failure to
consider alternative viewpoints or options.180 To the extent that age is
salient, it should as well, though more empirical research on age specifically
is needed to see if this is in fact the case.
Age diversity may also trigger group processes that harm group
outcomes. When in the presence of heterogeneity on salient characteristics,
including age, individuals often begin to sort themselves conceptually into
subgroups on the basis of those characteristics.181 This has the effect of
creating ingroups and outgroups through the process of social
categorization.182 After such groups are formed, there is a tendency to
valorize one’s own ingroup at the expense of the outgroup, which will be
subject to negative stereotyping.183 Thus, in the age context, individuals may
attribute some quality to people of the same age—e.g. old people are senile
or young people are irresponsible. This, in turn, may lead to tokenizing
members of certain age groups, which will suppress the sharing of different
perspectives and harm group outcomes.184
179

See Samuel R. Sommers, On Racial Diversity and Group Decision Making:
Identifying Multiple Effects of Racial Composition on Jury Deliberations, 90 J. PERSONALITY
SOC. PSYCHOL. 597, 606–08 (2006).
180 See IRVING L. JANIS, GROUPTHINK: PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES OF POLICY DECISIONS
AND FIASCOES 9 (1982) (defining groupthink as “a mode of thinking that people engage in
when they are deeply involved in a cohesive ingroup, when the members’ strivings for
unanimity override their motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses of action”);
Charlan J. Nemeth, Minority Influence as a Stimulant to Group Performance, in GROUPS
PROCESSES AND PRODUCTIVITY 95, 95 (Stephen Worchel et al. eds., 1992) (arguing that the
presence of minority opinions leads to increased divergent thinking and perspective taking).
See also Yaron Nili, Beyond the Numbers: Substantive Gender Diversity in Boardrooms, 94
IND. L.J. 145, 160–64 (2019) (discussing these arguments in the context of gender diversity
in corporate boards).
181 See DONN E. BYRNE, THE ATTRACTION PARADIGM 3 (1971) (describing this similarityattraction dynamic).
182 See Frank Dobbin & Jiwook Jung, Corporate Board Gender Diversity and Stock
Performance: The Competence Gap or Institutional Investor Bias?, 89 N.C. L. REV. 809, 815–
16 (2011) (“[P]eople are drawn to similar others. Mixed gender and racial groups may divide,
and diversity may elicit group conflict that interferes with efficacy. Diversity in race,
ethnicity, and, to a lesser extent, sex, tends to bring about group conflict, hinder
communication, and interfere with cooperation, thereby lowering performance.”) (footnote
omitted); John C. Turner, Social Categorization and the Self-Concept: A Social Cognitive
Theory of Group Behavior, in 2 ADVANCES IN GROUP PROCESSES: THEORY AND RESEARCH 77,
78–80 (1985) (suggesting that individuals classify themselves and others on the basis of
various dimensions).
183 See Marilynn B. Brewer & Rupert J. Brown, Intergroup Relations, in HANDBOOK OF
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 148, 150–55 (Daniel T. Gilbert et al. eds., 1998) (describing these
stereotyping processes).
184 See ROSABETH MOSS KANTER, MEN AND WOMAN OF THE CORPORATION 206–44
(1977) (describing the negative effects of token status, including stereotyping and the creation
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This conceptual sorting is often accompanied by actual sorting and
associated negative behaviors. Individuals who share a similarity of age may
be particularly motivated to interact with those who share the same age, as
they may believe they have similar values, interests, or experiences.185 This
can lead to decreased or erroneous communication between people of
different ages in the broader group.186 If there is an asymmetric allocation
of power between age groups within a certain setting, such group formation
can also lead to feelings of detachment or exclusion for members of an age
group not in power.187 All of these processes can harm group cohesiveness,
leading to social conflict or avoidance, which in turn can harm group
efficacy.
It is an empirical question whether the cognitive benefits of age diversity
outweigh the costs of social conflict. The limited but growing empirical
research on age or generational diversity typically focuses on teams in the
workplace context.188 The results are decidedly ambiguous, with studies
finding positive, negative, and no relationships between age diversity and
team performance or innovation.189 In addition, some studies have found age
diversity to be associated with higher turnover and absenteeism,190 while
others have found age diversity to be associated with lower levels of
of interpersonal boundaries); Joanna L. Young & Erika Hayes James, Token Majority: The
Work Attitudes of Male Flight Attendants, 45 SEX ROLES 299, 314 (2001) (associating token
status with lower satisfaction and organizational attachment).
185 See Barbara S. Lawrence, New Wrinkles in the Theory of Age: Demography, Norms,
and Performance Ratings, 31 ACAD. MGMT J. 309, 310–13 (1988) (describing how
demographic age influences age norms and produces age effects).
186 See Todd R. Zenger & Barbara S. Lawrence, Organizational Demography: The
Differential Effects of Age and Tenure Distributions on Technical Communication, 32 ACAD.
MGMT J. 353, 368 (1989) (finding that age and tenure similarity appeared to influence the
frequency of communication among co-workers).
187 See Matt Bloom, The Performance Effects of Pay Dispersion on Individuals and
Organizations, 42 ACAD. MGMT J. 25, 33 (1999) (finding hierarchical pay dispersion
associated with poor performance).
188 See Florian Kunze & Stephan A. Boehm, Research on Age Diversity in the Workforce:
Current Trends and Future Research Directions, in THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF AGING, WORK,
AND SOCIETY 41, 45–50 (John Field et al. eds., 2013) (collecting empirical studies of age
diversity).
189 Compare Suzanne T. Bell et al. Getting Specific about Demographic Diversity
Variable and Team Performance Relationships: A Meta-Analysis, 37 J MGMT 709, 738–43
(2011) (finding age diversity unrelated to team performance) with Aparna Joshi & Hyuntak
Roh, The Role of Context in Work Team Diversity Research: A Meta-Analytic Review, 52
ACAD. MGMT J. 599, 614–15 (finding age diversity had the most negative association with
team performance) and Martin Kilduff et al., Top Management-Team Diversity and Firm
Performance: Examining the Role of Cognition, 11 ORG. SCI. 21, 32 (2000) (finding age
diversity to be the only demographic diversity measure positively associated with team
performance).
190 See, e.g., Frances J. Milliken & Luis L. Martins, Searching for Common Threads:
Understanding the Multiple Effects of Diversity in Organizational Groups, 21 ACAD. MGMT
REV. 402, 427–28 (1996) (describing several studies finding correlations between age
diversity and absenteeism or turnover).
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emotional conflict.191 Further, it is not clear to what extent these results are
generalizable beyond the work contexts in which they were identified.
These mixed results suggest one of three possibilities.192 First, the
benefits and costs of age diversity for team performance cancel each other
out. Second, neither the benefits nor the costs of age diversity are
particularly significant, so there is no overall effect. Third, there are
mediator variables that have yet to be discovered that are important for the
actualization of the benefits or costs of age diversity. Further research is
needed to understand the relationship between age diversity, any potential
mediator variables, and various performance indicators of interest in the
workplace and other settings. Such research will put those in charge of
managing teams in a better position to reap any benefits of age diversity
while avoiding its costs.
In addition to these potential effects of age diversity on group efficacy,
age diversity may also impact individuals directly. The next Section
considers how age diversity might influence individual ageist beliefs or
attitudes.
E. Reducing Ageism
One of the consequences of having age diversity in a particular group or
institution is that it fosters contact between people of different ages or
generations. This contact, in turn, can help to eliminate stereotypes and
ageist attitudes under the right circumstances.193 In contrast to the arguments
already surveyed, this argument does not necessarily prescribe a particular
form that age diversity should take. These benefits would exist in institutions
that have a range of age diversities, though at least minimal diversity would
be required to facilitate cross-age interactions.
The proposition that contact across various forms of difference helps to
decrease prejudice as a general matter has robust empirical support.194
However, the relationship between contact and decreased prejudiced is
mediated by three variables. The first is knowledge, as increased contact
with an outgroup leads to greater knowledge of that outgroup, which can
191

See Lisa Hope Pelled et al, Exploring the Black Box: An Analysis of Work Group
Diversity, Conflict, and Performance, 44 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 1, 16 (1999) (finding age diversity
to have a significant negative relationship with emotional conflict).
192 See Matthias Schneid et al., Age Diversity and Team Outcomes: A Quantitative
Review, 31 J MANAGERIAL PSYCHOL. 2, 6 (2016) (describing the three possibilities in light of
heterogeneous results from the authors’ review).
193 See GORDON W. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE 261–81(1954) (exploring the
concept of prejudice and its relationship to intergroup contact).
194 See THOMAS F. PETTIGREW & LINDA R. TROPP, WHEN GROUPS MEET: THE DYNAMICS
OF INTERGROUP CONTACT (2011) (“[The] basic premise of contact theory is well-supported by
an ever-growing research base.”); Thomas F. Pettigrew & Linda R. Tropp, A Meta-Analytic
Test of Intergroup Contact Theory, 90 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 751 (2006)
(collecting studies).
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have a debiasing effect.195 The second mediator is anxiety; as individuals
encounter outgroup members, they become more familiar and such
encounters become less anxiety-inducing.196 The third mediator is empathy.
Contact, especially close friendships with outgroup members, can encourage
one to take the perspective of members of the outgroup, decreasing
prejudice.197 These mediators can also work in concert with each other.198
With respect to ageism, most empirical studies focus on the
psychological effects on younger individuals of interaction with older
ones.199 There have been relatively consistent findings that intergroup
contact either enhances positive attitudes, decreases ageist stereotypes, or
both.200 This finding, however, is not universal. When the age-based
intergroup contact contains an element of threat or uncertainty, the contact
can actually help foster stereotypes and negative conceptions of aging. For
instance, one study brought 4- and 5-year olds to a nursing home to interact
with older individuals living there who were heavily impaired. These visits
did not serve to counter stereotypes about the elderly, and the children left
with more negative attitudes towards the elderly and towards their own
aging.201
195 See Walter G. Stephan & Cookie White Stephan, The Role of Ignorance in Intergroup
Relations, in GROUPS IN CONTACT: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF DESEGREGATION 229, 244 (Miller
Brewer ed., 1984) (arguing that ignorance contributes to intergroup prejudice).
196 See Jim Blascovich et al., Perceiver Threat in Social Interactions with Stigmatized
Others, 80 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 253, 265–66 (2001) (finding that white study
participants who had prior interracial contact showed lower levels of anxiety).
197 See C. Daniel Batson et al., Empathy and Attitudes: Can Feeling for a Member of a
Stigmatized Group Improve Feelings Toward the Group?, 72 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 105, 116–17 (1997) (finding that inducing empathy for various stigmatized groups
can decrease prejudice towards those groups).
198 See PETTIGREW & TROPP, supra note 194, at 84–86 (showing the interactions between
these mediators).
199 This is the typical pattern in stereotype research, as it tends to focus on the effects of
intergroup contact on the “majority.” But see David S. Meshel & Richard P. McGlynn,
Intergenerational Contact, Attitudes, and Stereotypes of Adolescents and Older People, 30
EDUC. GERONTOLOGY 457, 475–76 (2004) (finding intergenerational contact produced more
positive attitudes towards the young among older participants).
200 See Tania Tam et al., Intergroup Contact and Grandparent-Grandchild
Communication: The Effects of Self-Disclosure on Implicit and Explicit Biases Against Older
People, 9 GROUP PROCESSES & INTERGROUP REL. 413, 420 (2006); Natalie N. Hale, Effects of
Age and Interpersonal Contact on Stereotyping of the Elderly, 17 CURRENT PSYCHOL. 28, 36
(1998) (finding that adolescents experiencing positive contact with the elderly possessed
fewer age-based stereotypes); Avshalom Caspi, Contact Hypothesis and Inter-Age Attitudes:
A Field Study of Cross-Age Contact, 47 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 74, 78 (1984) (“[C]hildren with
cross-age contact in school can discriminate age-group categories better and evaluate the
elderly more favorably than their counterparts in the age-segregated school.”).
201 See Carol Seefeldt, The Effects of Preschoolers’ Visits to a Nursing Home, 27 THE
GERONTOLOGIST 228, 231 (1987). See also Linda J. Allan & James A. Johnson,
Undergraduate Attitudes Toward the Elderly: The Role of Knowledge, Contact and Aging
Anxiety, 35 EDUC. GERONTOLOGY 1, 11–12 (2009) (finding that anxiety about aging mediates
between experience with the elderly and negative attitudes towards the elderly).
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These findings suggest that intergenerational contact does not
automatically lead to decreased ageism.202 The factors that have been shown
to facilitate the positive effects of intergroup contact are a sense of equal
status among participants, an orientation towards a common goal, a
cooperative atmosphere, and institutional support for the intergroup
contact.203 Other studies have found that the frequency of contact is
important, as extended contacts allow deeper relationships to develop.204
More empirical research is needed in this area, especially on the effects of
intergroup contact on ageism against the young.205 However, it does appear
that to the extent that age diversity encourages cross-age contact, and to the
extent that such contact occurs in the right set of conditions, it can lead to
decreased age-based prejudice.
***
As these various normative rationales demonstrate, age diversity’s
effects are varied, and some of these effects will be more salient in some
contexts as opposed to others. However, more empirical research is needed
to establish the strength of these effects so that legal decision-makers may
better know how to weigh age diversity against other policy interests. If age
diversity of a certain type is worth pursuing in the final analysis, the law is
one vehicle through which to do it. The next Part examines how various
types of legal rules influence the form that age diversity takes and how
adopting an age diversity lens may suggest potential avenues for legal
reform.
III. AGE DIVERSITY AND THE LAW
While the first Part described age diversity as a concept and the second
Part described the normative cases for and against various forms of age
diversity, this Part addresses how age diversity intersects with the law. Legal
rules play an important role in shaping the age diversity of various
institutions or society as a whole. This Part will demonstrate how adopting

202 See Julie Christian et al., Does Intergenerational Contact Reduce Ageism? When and
How Contact Interventions Actually Work?, 3 J. ARTS & HUMAN. 1, 8 (2014) (collecting
studies and noting that more long-term contact is associated with more positive attitudes
towards the elderly).
203 See PETTIGREW & TROPP, supra note 194, at 61–76 (evaluating the evidence for these
conditions); ALLPORT, supra note 193, at 264–67 (originally outlining these conditions).
204 See Ashley Lytle & Sheri R. Levy, Reducing Ageism: Education About Aging and
Extended Contact with Older Adults, 59 THE GERONTOLOGIST 580, 586–87 (2017) (finding
that increased aging-related knowledge and extended intergenerational contact was associated
with less ageist attitudes).
205 See North & Fiske, supra note 14, at 991–92 (articulating a need for more research
on ageist attitudes towards the young).
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an age diversity lens can highlight underappreciated aspects of policy
debates, inform our normative judgments about various legal rules, and
suggest fresh avenues for legal reform. Section A describes the different
types of rules that serve to regulate age diversity. Section B then applies the
age diversity lens to three contexts: immigration, juries, and the workplace.
A. Legal Rules
The form that age diversity takes is a complex product of individual
decision-making, social norms, and legal rules. These legal rules regulate
age diversity both directly and indirectly and take three primary forms,
discussed in each of the subsections below: age-conscious rules, age
discrimination rules, and age-neutral rules.
1. Age-Conscious Rules
Age-conscious rules explicitly integrate age into a legal directive. Such
age-based law is ubiquitous, but the rules of interest here are those that
actually have an effect on the age diversity of groups, even if that might not
be their purpose.206 Most age-conscious rules take advantage of the
determinate and administrable nature of age by integrating it into bright-line
rules as a triggering fact.207 These rules often adopt age as a criterion for
membership in public institutions. For instance, the Constitution actively
limits the age diversity of Congress by prohibiting the entry of those under
the age of 25 into the House of Representatives and under the age of 30 into
the Senate, even though people of those ages are otherwise considered full
citizens for the purposes of voting and military service.208 On the other end
of the age spectrum, most states actively regulate the age diversity of the
judiciary by mandating the retirement of judges after a certain age, either
through their Constitutions or statutory law.209 These bright-line rules were

206 See Boni-Saenz, supra note 33, at 854–56 (describing the ubiquity of age-based law).
However, rules that simply establish legal entitlements, such as the rule establishing the age
at which one may enter into contracts or receive Social Security, do not impact groups or their
age diversity and are not relevant here. See, e.g., 5 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD,
A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 9:3 (4th ed. 2009) (discussing the contractual age
of majority in various jurisdictions); What is Full Retirement Age?, 20 C.F.R. § 404.409
(2015) (setting the retirement age).
207 See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV.
L. REV. 22, 58 (1992) (noting that rules “bind a decisionmaker to respond ... to the presence
of delimited triggering facts”).
208 See U.S. CONST. art I, § 2 (“No Person shall be a Representative who shall not have
attained to the Age of twenty five Years”); id. at art I, § 3 (“No Person shall be a Senator who
shall not have attained to the Age of thirty Years”).
209 See National Center for State Courts, Most States Require Judges to Step Down After
70 (Apr. 5, 2010), https://www.ncsc.org/Newsroom/Backgrounder/2010/MandatoryRetirement.aspx (reporting that 31 states and the District of Columbia impose mandatory
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adopted to select for qualities thought to be desirable in Congress or the
judiciary rather than to influence the age diversity of those institutions, but
they clearly have that latter effect as well. And they achieve this effect quite
efficiently, even if using age as a triggering fact risks enshrining in the law
a certain age essentialism about qualifications for serving in certain
positions.210
While less common, age-conscious rules can also take a more standardlike form and have age diversity as their aim well.211 For example, Alabama
considers age diversity as a relevant criterion, often alongside other forms of
diversity, for the selection of members to various state boards or task
forces.212 Age-based standards may help mitigate some of the costs of age
diversity by obfuscating the relative importance of age to selection, reducing
concerns about age essentialism. In addition, to the extent that standards
consider various factors in a totality of the circumstances analysis, the
consideration of various selection criteria together will also mitigate any
crowding out effects of rules that rely exclusively on age.213 However,
because this entails significant discretion for the legal decision-maker
implementing them, it is not always clear what form of age diversity might
materialize in any given case.214

retirement). The ages at which retirement is required vary significantly by state. See, e.g.,
FLA. CONST. ART. V, § 8 (“No justice or judge shall serve after attaining the age of seventyfive years except upon temporary assignment.”); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 43:6A-7 (West 2018)
(“Any member of the retirement system who has reached the age of 70 years shall be retired
forthwith.”); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 609 (West 2018) (“The Justices of the Supreme Court
and judges of all subordinate courts shall be required to retire at the end of the calendar year
in which they attain 90 years of age.”).
210 See Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CAL. L. REV. 953, 972 (1995)
(“Because of their simplifying effects, rules produce enormous gains where decisions would
otherwise be extremely expensive.”). See also Peter Baehr & Daniel Gordon, Paradoxes of
Diversity, in THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY 977, 980 (William Outhwhaite
& Stephen P. Turner eds., 2018) (“The first paradox of diversity is that an idea that is
emblematic of openness reinforces closed systems of classification. While some advocates of
diversity celebrate the fluidity of the individual’s identity, once diversity becomes an
institutional goal, a static mode of benchmarking comes to the fore.”).
211 See Sullivan, supra note 207, at 58 (“A legal directive is “standard”-like when it tends
to collapse decisionmaking back into the direct application of the background principle or
policy to a fact situation.”).
212 See ALA. CODE § 34-3-41 (requiring that the Board of Commissioners for the state
judicial circuits be selected taking into account age as well as other forms of diversity); ALA.
CODE § 17-4-34 (requiring age diversity in the selection of members for the State Voter
Registration Advisory Board); ALA. CODE § 16-40-9 (“Eight members appointed by the
Governor representing the eight regional school board districts and reflecting the racial,
ethnic, gender, and age diversity of the state.”).
213 See Mark A. Hall, Law, Medicine, and Trust, 55 STAN. L. REV. 463, 510 (2002)
(explaining the crowding out phenomenon in the context of motivation).
214 See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J.
557, 609 (1992) (“Rules may be preferred to standards in order to limit discretion, thereby
minimizing abuses of power.”).
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2. Age Discrimination Rules

The law may be age-conscious in a different way. Rather than
incorporating age into the law explicitly, it may actively prohibit the
consideration of age by public or private actors. This is the domain of
antidiscrimination law, and it has two main sources. The first is the Equal
Protection Clause of the Constitution, which prevents the government from
creating certain legal classifications.215 As this applies to age, the Supreme
Court held in Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia that age-based
classifications are only subject to rational basis review, making most agebased law permissible.216 This means that there is wide latitude to pursue
age diversity through governmental rules, provided such pursuit can be
construed as rational and not arbitrary.
The second source of age-based antidiscrimination law is statutory.217
This law primarily applies to private actors, and it may limit the
consideration of age in a variety of domains. For example, at the federal
level, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act prohibits many
employment decisions based solely on age for those over the age of 40.218
Age-based antidiscrimination law also applies to other domains, sometimes
explicitly and at other times because courts read age into a relevant
antidiscrimination statute.219 Provided that these statutes are effective,220
they leave the age diversity of institutions to other social forces.
It is not always clear what the effect of these antidiscrimination rules or
their absence might be. Housing presents an interesting example. The
federal Fair Housing Act does not prohibit discrimination on the basis of
age.221 It does, however, contain a prohibition on discrimination on the basis
of familial status.222 Such a provision has age diversity implications because
it would prohibit discrimination against family forms that are themselves age
diverse, such as an adult with a minor child. Yet this familial status
antidiscrimination provision contains exceptions for “housing for older
215

See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
See 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976).
217 See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 623 (2012) (“It shall be unlawful for an employer—(1) to fail
or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual’s age . . . .”).
218 See id.
219 See, e.g., Pizarro v. Lamb’s Players Theatre, 37 Cal. Rptr. 3d 859, 861 (Cal. Ct. App.
2006) (noting that while age is not explicitly protected in the statute, age discrimination may
still contravene it under certain circumstances).
220 See infra Part III.B.3 (discussing how there are several doctrinal avenues for getting
around the prohibitions on age discrimination in employment).
221 See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) (2012) (including a variety of identity categories but omitting
age). Some states, however, do have explicit age-based antidiscrimination protections in the
realm of housing. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-64c (West 2017) (prohibiting the refusal
to sell or rent because of age); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4503 (West 2016) (same).
222 See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) (2012) (including familial status as a protected category).
216
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persons,” meaning that said parent with child could be excluded.223 Whether
a housing development qualifies as housing for older persons turns on
whether the development lacks age diversity. It must either be solely
occupied by persons older than 62, or be 80% occupied by persons older than
55, and it must have concrete policies expressing the intent for this to remain
the case.224
Without the exception above, discrimination law would prohibit the
creation of intentional senior housing.225 However, this would not
necessarily lead to intergenerational communities, for two reasons. First,
age-homogeneous communities can arise naturally, for instance in areas that
experience a large out-migration of youth or in which a population has aged
in place.226 Second, a blanket antidiscrimination rule would also prohibit
using age to create intentional intergenerational communities, where
residents might be selected in part because of how they might enhance the
age mix of a development.227 This illustrates that while the presence of age
discrimination rules may prevent intentional age segregation, they do not
ensure any particular form of age diversity. Nor does the absence of such
rules lead to a determinate outcome in every case.
3. Age-Neutral Rules
Finally, the law might neither integrate age nor prohibit its consideration,
but regulate age diversity indirectly.228 Sometimes an age-neutral rule will
affect age diversity because it regulates some correlate of age. For example,
many unions bargain for seniority rules in collective bargaining agreements,
which give preferences to employees of longer tenure, often in the context
of layoffs.229 These rules can be justified on numerous grounds, such as
rewarding cumulative effort and loyalty, or protecting workers who have the

§ 3607(b) (“Nor does any provision in this subchapter regarding familial status
apply with respect to housing for older persons.”).
224 See id. § 3607(b)(2)(B)–(C) (defining housing for older persons).
225 See Robert G. Schwemm & Michael Allen, For the Rest of Their Lives: Seniors and
the Fair Housing Act, 90 IOWA L. REV. 121, 156–58 (2004) (discussing how these exemptions
facilitate housing options for seniors).
226 See Jon Pynoos et. al., Aging in Place, Housing, and the Law, 16 ELDER L.J. 77, 102–
03 (2008) (describing how naturally occurring retirement communities arise).
227 See Patricia E. Salkin, A Quiet Crisis in America: Meeting the Affordable Housing
Needs of the Invisible Low-Income Healthy Seniors, 16 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 285,
309 (2009) (discussing the affordability benefits of intergenerational housing).
228 See Allen, supra note 142, at 84–85 (noting that an organization’s rules will affect
whether diversity is present).
229 See Gary Chartier, Toward A New Employer-Worker Compact, 9 EMP. RTS. & EMP.
POL'Y J. 51, 99 (2005) (“[Seniority rules] determine which workers will be affected by layoffs:
senior workers are characteristically the last to be laid off and the first to be rehired.”); Richard
A. Posner, Some Economics of Labor Law, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 988, 1000 (1984) (noting that
labor unions often bargain for the inclusion of seniority rules).
223 See id.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3691315

38

LAW REVIEW

greatest skills based on experience.230 But because tenure is correlated with
age, they also have a significant effect on age diversity, as layoffs will target
the employees with the least tenure, who are more likely to be younger
overall. This will lead all other things being equal to an age distribution in
the workforce that skews older.
At other times, age-neutral rules neither concern age nor one of its
correlates but may still have a large impact on age diversity. For instance,
consider how jury selection worked in the past versus the present. Before
the 1960s, many jurisdictions selected jury members by using the
recommendations of a citizen of good reputation in the community—a “key
man.”231 Because the recommendations derived from the social networks of
this key man, juries were not representative of the demographic diversity of
the community, including age.232 In contrast, while the modern process still
has its flaws, it starts with the principle of random selection.233 This is more
likely to produce a jury pool that is representative of the adult population as
a whole.234
As can be seen from these examples, age-neutral rules are often geared
toward some other policy objective or do not otherwise take age into account.
This makes any resulting age diversity a byproduct of the primary aim of the
legal regulation. Thus, this category of rules is the most diverse of the three
types, taking a variety of forms and leading towards different forms of age
diversity depending on the context in which they are employed.
B.

Legal Applications

This Section applies an age diversity lens to three illustrative examples.
The first case of immigration demonstrates that age diversity can be a
societal rather than just an institutional issue. The second case of the jury
involves a fundamental public institution and examines how age-neutral
rules can produce non-ideal forms of age diversity. However, the weak
regulation of age-based classifications in Equal Protection jurisprudence as
compared to race actually frees the government to use age-conscious rules to
implement reforms that might improve the representative nature of the jury.
230

See Ronen Perry & Tal Z. Zarsky, Queues in Law, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1595, 1619, 1625
(2014) (offering various rationales for seniority rules).
231 See Robert P. Burns, The History and Theory of the American Jury, 83 CAL. L. REV.
1477, 1489 (1995) (describing the key man system).
232 See Vikram David Amar, Jury Service As Political Participation Akin to Voting, 80
CORNELL L. REV. 203, 211 (1995) (noting that the key man system “has been used to weed
out young adults”); Carl H. Imlay, Federal Jury Reformation: Saving a Democratic
Institution, 6 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 247, 250 (1973) (“The ‘Main Street town booster,’ a middleaged male in the middle income bracket, remained the prototype of our federal juror.”).
233 See Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The Big Data Jury, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 935, 936
(2016) (“In an effort to avoid historically rooted discriminatory practices, courts have limited
the data collected about jurors and randomized the selection process.”).
234 See infra Part III.B.2 (discussing the age diversity issues in the modern jury).
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The third example of the workplace demonstrates how in some contexts the
case for age diversity may be relatively weak. However, a close examination
of antidiscrimination doctrines in this area reveals avenues through which
employers might still pursue age diversity goals, though perhaps in ways that
violate antidiscrimination norms.
1. Immigration
The aging of the population has caused some consternation among
commentators, who have called it everything from an “age wave”235 to an
“aging tsunami”236 to a “time bomb.”237 This alarmist rhetoric may overstate
the problem, but there is indeed an issue, which is that an older population
often entails a less favorable age dependency ratio, which can cause social
and economic stresses for taxpayers and caregivers.238 Thus, a particular
form of proxy age diversity is desirable—one in which a larger share of the
population lies within the range of ages associated with attachment to the
labor market.239 In addition to ensuring a tax base sufficient to fund
governmental programs, working-age adults are needed to provide
caregiving labor for an older population.240
Immigration law is one of the few policy levers available to address the
age composition of society.241 Indeed, adjusting immigration law is likely a
necessary, but not sufficient, solution to the demographic challenges
ahead.242 Yet immigration has long been associated with discussions about

235 See KEN DYCHTWALD, AGE WAVE: HOW THE MOST IMPORTANT TREND OF OUR TIME
WILL CHANGE THE FUTURE (1990).
236 See Amanda Barusch, The Aging Tsunami: Time for a New Metaphor?, 56 J.
GERONTOLOGICAL SOC. WORK 181, 181 (2013) (“There’s nothing human about a tsunami.
It’s a nasty metaphor for older adults.”).
237 See MARK ADLER, TIME BOMB: HOW THE AGING POPULATION WILL TRANSFORM OUR
WORLD AND WHY WE MUST ACT BEFORE IT’S TOO LATE (2019).
238 See supra text accompanying notes 105–109.
239 See Howard F. Chang, The Economics of Immigration Reform, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
111, 135 (2018) (“Recall that youth at the time of entry is an important factor determining the
total fiscal impact of an immigrant.”).
240 See generally AI-JEN POO, THE AGE OF DIGNITY: PREPARING FOR THE ELDER BOOM
(2016) (arguing for a relaxed immigration policy to boost the number of potential eldercare
workers). See also Stephen Lee, Productivity and Affinity in the Age of Dignity, 114 MICH.
L. REV. 1137, 1147 (2016) (describing how increasing family-based immigration can help
with worker shortages in eldercare).
241 See Juha Alho, Migration, Fertility, and Aging in Stable Populations, 45
DEMOGRAPHY 641, 649 (2008) (finding that immigration can reduce the aging of the
population under certain circumstances). See also JONATHAN GRANT ET AL., LOW FERTILITY
AND POPULATION AGEING: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND POLICY OPTIONS 18–40 (2004)
(discussing other available policy options).
242 See Marta Tienda, Economic Implications of Demographic Change: Diversity
Dividend or Deficit?, 51 BUS. ECON. 11, 14–15 (2016) (arguing for educational initiatives for
the smaller cohorts of youth); David A Wise, Facilitating Longer Working Lives:
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racial diversity rather than age diversity, and this tendency towards racialized
immigration rhetoric has only increased in recent years.243 This crowding
out of age diversity in immigration debates is unfortunate, as a highly
restrictive immigration policy will not aid countries in reaching a
normatively desirable societal age diversity. Japan provides an ominous
warning for the United States in this regard.244 While it is experiencing the
decline in fertility associated with most industrialized countries, it has also
adopted a highly restrictive immigration regime.245 This has led to several
problems, including depopulated towns, worker shortages, and lackluster
economic growth.246
Thus, as an initial matter, welcoming more immigrants would seem to
be a valuable policy goal from an age diversity perspective.247 However, it
is not only the number but also the age profile of entering migrants that might
matter for the purposes of influencing the age composition of society. For
instance, family-based migrants can be of any age, but preference is given to
those who are immediate relatives—defined as minor children, spouses, and
parents of a citizen of the United States—over other relations, such as
siblings and adult children.248 A large proportion of those who immigrate
International Evidence on Why and How, 47 DEMOGRAPHY S131, S135 (2010) (arguing for
the need to extend the working lives of older adults).
243 See Marta Tienda, Demography and Social Contract, 39 DEMOGRAPHY 587, 589–92
(2002) (discussing the racial and ethnic dimensions to immigration). This connection has
been emphasized by President Trump’s racialized immigration stance. See Jennifer M.
Chacón, Immigration and the Bully Pulpit, 130 HARV. L. REV. F. 243, 246 (2017) (“For his
many supporters, President Trump paints a picture of a nation besieged by a flood of criminal
and terrorist immigrants”). This rhetoric has manifested in a restrictive set of immigration
policies. See SARAH PIERCE, MIGRATION POLICY INSTITUTE, IMMIGRATION-RELATED POLICY
CHANGES IN THE FIRST TWO YEARS OF THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION 16–25, 28–39 (2019)
(detailing restrictive policies for humanitarian, family, and employment-based immigration).
244 See Alexander J. Q. Parsons & Stuart Gilmour, An Evaluation of Fertility and
Migration-Based Policy Responses to Japan’s Ageing Population, 13 PLOS ONE e0209285
(2018) (concluding that it is too late for fertility and migration policies to reduce Japan’s old
age dependency ratio at this point).
245 See Francisco Toro, Japan is a Trumpian Paradise of Low Immigration Rates. It’s
also a Dying Country., WASH. POST (Aug. 29, 2019) (“Japan proves that the choice between
homogeneity and diversity is real. It’s just that homogeneity leads to decline, while diversity
offers at least a chance of ongoing vitality and prosperity.”).
246 See id.
247 See John Field, Migration and Workforce Aging, in Field, supra note 188, at 75, 79
(“For countries with an aging population, migration offers an obvious potential source of
replacements.”).
248 See 8 U.S.C. § 1151 (West 2018) (noting that there is no numerical limitation for
“children, spouses, and parents of a citizen of the United States”); WILLIAM A. KANDEL,
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, U.S FAMILY-BASED IMMIGRATION POLICY 3 n. 19 (2018)
(clarifying how U.S. immigration law distinguishes between minor children (under 21 years
of age), unmarried children over the age of 21, and married sons and daughters). At the same
time, several other categories, including adult children and siblings of citizens and spouses
and unmarried children of legal permanent residents, are subject to different sets of
immigration caps. See 8 U.S.C. § 1153 (West 2018).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3691315

AGE DIVERSITY

41

under the family-based immigration regime are minor children, which is a
salutary outcome from an age diversity perspective.249 However, this is not
an inevitable outcome, and the age profile of family-based migrants appears
to be shifting older. This is due in part to the migration of parents of U.S.
citizens as well as siblings who have aged waiting for entry due to the
backlog in distribution of visas for those in less-favored immigration
categories.250 This mix of age-neutral rules based on family relationship and
age-conscious rules distinguishing between minor and adult children thus
interact with a particular social context to produce a certain age profile of
incoming immigrants.
While the composition of family-based migrants is largely a byproduct
of rules that have other policy aims, it is also possible to engineer more
explicitly the age profile of incoming immigrants by relying more on ageconscious rules. For example, some countries explicitly integrate age as a
selection criterion for potential labor migrants through the use of a points
system, which assigns each potential migrant points for qualities that are
meant to be predictive of immigrant success and align with societal values.251
To be allowed to immigrate, an applicant must score a certain predetermined
number of points or must fall at the top of the point distribution of all
applicants.252 Frequent criteria include education, work experience,
language proficiency, offers of employment, close family ties, and prior
work or education in the receiving country.253 Age is also often a criterion,

249
See ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT,
INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION OUTLOOK 2017 124 (2017) ([C]hildren made up large shares of
the family migration inflows to the United States and Germany (at least 40% and 34%,
respectively).”).
250 See Marta Tienda, Multiplying Diversity: Family Unification and the Regional
Origins of Late-Age US Immigrants, 51 INT’L MIGRATION REV. 727, 743 (2015) (“Parents of
US citizens, who are not subject to annual country caps or worldwide ceilings, are the major
source of late-age migration, but the numerically limited admission classes consisting of adult
sons, daughters and siblings of US citizens increasingly contribute to late-age migration
owing to long visa queues for oversubscribed countries.”); Stacie Carr & Marta Tienda,
Family Sponsorship and Late-Age Immigration in Aging America, 32 POP. RES. POL’Y REV.
825, 827 (2013) (“[T]he immigrant cohort share ages 50 and over at admission to the United
States increased from about 11 percent for persons legally admitted between 1981 and 1985
to nearly 17 percent for those admitted between 2006 and 2009.”).
251 See generally Stephen Yale-Loehr & Christoph Hoashi-Erhardt, A Comparative Look
at Immigration and Human Capital Assessment, 16 GEO. IMMGR. L.J. 99 (2001) (assessing
Canada’s points system’s predictive capacity).
252 See RUTH ELLEN WASEM & CHAD C. HADDAL, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE,
POINT SYSTEMS FOR IMMIGRANT SELECTION: OPTIONS AND ISSUES 3 (2007) (noting that “the
factors/criteria, the scoring/scaling dimensions; and the possible use of tiers” are the design
choices for a points system).
253 See Stephen Yale-Loehr, Christoph Hoashi-Erhardt, A Comparative Look at
Immigration and Human Capital Assessment, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 99, 105–08 (2001)
(discussing various categories in which points might be awarded).
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though it receives different weight depending on the country’s system.254
Such an approach has been suggested in the United States as well. In 2013,
the Senate passed a bill that included a points system as a supplement to the
current regime, and President Trump has also proposed his own points
system, albeit coupled with a more restrictive immigration regime overall.255
The demographics of the nation and the immigration system that informs
it are complex, with many moving parts that might contribute to desired
outcomes. In addition, the age mix of the population is one among many
concerns that inform immigration policy, and it is not suggested here that
age diversity objectives should always supersede other important policy
aims. Instead, the lesson is that it is important to be conscious of the age
composition of society given its multiple consequences, and any analysis of
immigration law would be incomplete without some scrutiny of its age
diversity effects.
2. The Jury
In contrast to the vastness of the American population, the jury
represents a small group of individuals dedicated to the common task of
arriving at a verdict in a legal proceeding. In this setting, the case for age
diversity—though of a different type—appears quite strong. Because the
jury is a high-profile public legal institution, the argument from
representation is at its strongest. The Supreme Court has embraced this
particular understanding of representation, at least at a general level, by
endorsing the fair cross section requirement for juries as an element of Sixth
Amendment jurisprudence.256 Jury cases are also paradigmatic problemsolving groups, and the issues involved often have a strong human element.
This is the situation in which age or other forms of identity diversity are more

254

See Chris Gafner & Stephen Yale-Loehr, Attracting the Best and the Brightest: A
Critique of the Current U.S. Immigration System, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 183, 209 (2010)
(describing how a points systems can integrate age alongside other factors). See also YaleLoehr & Hoashi-Erhardt, supra note 251, at 111–12 (discussing the Canadian points system);
id at 122–23 (discussing the Australian points system). But see Eric A. Posner, The
Institutional Structure of Immigration Law, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 289, 303–04 (2013) (critiquing
points systems).
255 See Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act, S.
744, 113th Cong. §§ 2301, 2302 (2013). See also JULIA GELATT, MIGRATION POLICY
INSTITUTE, THE RAISE ACT: DRAMATIC CHANGE TO FAMILY IMMIGRATION, LESS SO FOR THE
EMPLOYMENT-BASED SYSTEM (2017) (describing the move towards a points system for labor
migration while cutting family migration).
256 See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 528 (1975) (“[T]he selection of a petit jury
from a representative cross section of the community is an essential component of the Sixth
Amendment right to a jury trial.”). See also Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 370, (1979)
(“We stress, however, that the constitutional guarantee to a jury drawn from a fair cross
section of the community requires that States exercise proper caution in exempting broad
categories of persons from jury service.”).
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likely to add value to deliberations.257 Finally, the experience of
participating on a team with members of other ages may serve to reduce
ageist stereotypes in jury members, especially since threat and competition
are absent from this context. There is also some evidence that more age
diverse juries leave jurors more satisfied with their own participation and the
verdict itself.258
The downsides of age diversity are also less applicable to juries. There
are minimal qualifications required for jury service such that age will not
crowd out other characteristics that might be desirable, and it will not prevent
challenges for cause.259 The social conflict that might be engendered by age
diversity in the group is mitigated by the fact that the group is nonhierarchical in nature and is aimed at a common goal.260 Thus, the
application of the arguments for and against age diversity suggest that the
jury box should reflect the age distribution of the relevant community, which
will also have the effect of having at least minimal age heterogeneity, given
the small size of the jury.
How well does the age composition of juries map on to these ideals?
Unfortunately, courts in many states do not collect data on the age of jurors
or potential jurors, so it is hard to know the precise age composition of
juries.261 We know that the jury selection process starts with the principle of
random selection, but there are several reasons why we might doubt that
juries are in practice appropriately diverse with respect to age. First, the
process for generating the jury pool has structural age biases. For example,
not all states allow the privilege of jury service at age 18.262 Even in those
that do, the lists from which potential jurors are drawn may be incomplete or

257 See Roger Allan Ford, Modeling the Effects of Peremptory Challenges on Jury
Selection and Jury Verdicts, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 377, 416 (2010) (“[R]esearch suggests
that the presence of minority jurors positively impacts the collective process of jury
decisionmaking, leading to better information exchange.”).
258 See Nancy S. Marder, Juries, Justice & Multiculturalism, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 659, 692
(2002) (“[A]s the jury became more age diverse, the jurors became more satisfied with their
experience as jurors, and they estimated that other jurors would be more satisfied with the
verdict.”).
259 See Hopt v. Utah, 120 U.S. 430, 433 (1887) (discussing the grounds for a for-cause
challenge).
260 See supra text accompanying notes 202–204.
261 See Pamela Entzel et al., Elders and Jury Service: A Case of Age Discrimination?, in
ELDERS, CRIME, AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 163, 164 (Max B. Rothman et al. eds.,
2000) (“Courts in many states do not collect or record age-specific information on summoned
jurors who decline service, report for service, or ultimately progress to panels.”).
262 See Todres, supra note 126, at 1137 (noting that 46 states allow jury service at age
18, while in Alabama and Nebraska the age is 19, and Mississippi and Missouri the age is 21).
For an argument that excluding those over the age of eighteen from jury service is
unconstitutional, see Amar, supra note 232, at 206 (arguing that jury service is a legal
entitlement akin to voting).
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inadequate, often in ways that disfavor the young.263 Cutting in the other
direction is the fact that over half of the states have jury service exemptions
for those aged 65 or 70 and over, likely decreasing participation by that age
group.264
Second, the main legal safeguards that exist to ensure adequate diversity
on the jury simply do not exist for age. In order to invoke the fair cross
section requirement to challenge the composition of a jury, one must assert
that there is a cohesive group that has been systematically excluded from the
pool.265 When confronted with this question, courts have been unwilling to
see age groups—either younger or older—as representing cohesive groups
for the purposes of the Sixth Amendment.266 Further along in the jury
selection process are peremptory challenges, whereby attorneys can remove
individuals from the jury without providing a reason.267 After Batson v.
Kentucky,268 race is technically no longer a permissible ground for such
challenges, though there are serious doubts about whether Batson has been
effective in eliminating peremptory strikes based on race.269 Nonetheless,

263 See Shari Seidman Diamond & Andrea Ryken, The Modern American Jury A One
Hundred Year Journey, 96 JUDICATURE 315, 317 (2013) (“Voter lists do not supply a random
sample of citizens. Indeed, minorities, the young, and the highly mobile tend to be
underrepresented.”). A majority of states use voter registration lists or licensed driver’s lists
to obtain names, while a small minority of states mandate supplementation of these lists with
other sources. See HON. GREGORY E. MIZE ET AL., THE STATE-OF-THE-STATES SURVEY OF
JURY IMPROVEMENT EFFORTS: A COMPENDIUM REPORT 13–14 (2007) (finding that 35 and 38
states mandate the use of licensed drivers and voter registration lists respectively, but that
only 8 and 3 mandate the use of state/local tax or unemployment compensation records
respectively). Even then, supplementation may not be a perfect fix. See John P. Bueker, Jury
Source Lists: Does Supplementation Really Work?, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 390, 415–20 (1997)
(gathering data from federal district courts demonstrating that supplementation did not
necessarily increase racial diversity).
264 See MIZE ET AL., supra note 263, at 15 (noting that 27 states have age-based
exemptions).
265 See Thiel v. S. Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 224 (1946) (rejecting the systematic and
automatic exclusion of certain groups as an unacceptable way of convening a jury).
266 See, e.g., Silagy v. Peters, 905 F.2d 986, 1011 (7th Cir. 1990) (“[P]ersons over the
age of seventy do not constitute a ‘distinctive group’ for purposes of the sixth amendment”);
Ford v. Seabold, 841 F.2d 677, 682 (6th Cir. 1988) (“We agree with the First Circuit that it is
impossible to clearly delineate the age boundaries of ‘young adults’ and that such a group,
therefore, cannot by definition be distinctive.”); Barber v. Ponte, 772 F.2d 982, 1000 (1st Cir.
1985) (“[W]e should avoid the overwhelming problems and sterile solutions that will result
from attempting to subdivide a continuum of ages into ‘distinctive groups.’”).
267 See MARDER, supra note 28, at 84 (“Peremptory challenges are the challenges that
lawyers exercise to remove prospective jurors from the panel without, at least traditionally,
having to explain why.”).
268 See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986) (holding that race-based peremptory
challenges violates the Equal Protection Clause).
269 See Nancy S. Marder, Batson Revisited, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1585, 1589–95 (2012)
(describing the many defects of Batson challenges).
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Batson has been extended to gender270 and ethnicity271 as well. In contrast,
courts consistently permit peremptory challenges on the basis of age, even
when that is the articulated reason for the strike.272 And both prosecutors
and defense attorneys do appear to strike potential jurors on that basis.273
This is particularly concerning given the empirical evidence that the age
composition of the jury affects trial outcomes in the criminal context.274
It is unclear what effects these deviations from random selection have
on the jury pool or final juries. It is possible that the net effect is neutral and
what is left are juries that are relatively representative of the population.
However, it is also quite possible, if not likely, that it leaves our jury system
with both young and old underrepresented. Knowing for certain requires
further empirical research on the age composition of juries, but this need not
stop us from considering possible legal reforms that might address the
sources of the bias.
One potential tool for ensuring adequate age diversity on juries is to
employ stratified jury selection at the beginning of the jury selection process,
by which courts summon differential numbers of individuals based on their
demographic characteristics in order to ensure the representativeness of the
jury pool.275 Such approaches have encountered obstacles in court. In
United States v. Ovalle, the Sixth Circuit struck down a jury plan that
subtracted at random individuals of overrepresented racial groups in order to

270 See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 129 (1994) (extending Batson
challenges to gender).
271 See Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 355 (1991) (noting that a Batson challenge
can be made on the basis of ethnicity).
272 See Hidalgo v. Fagen, Inc., 206 F.3d 1013, 1019 (10th Cir. 2000) (“Fagen’s counsel
struck Ms. Gonzales because of her youth. We have held this to be an acceptable race-neutral
justification for exercising a peremptory strike.”); Weber v. Strippit, Inc., 186 F.3d 907, 911
(8th Cir. 1999) (“[A]n an age-based motivation for exercising peremptory challenges does not
violate equal protection.”).
273 See David C. Baldus et. al., The Use of Peremptory Challenges in Capital Murder
Trials: A Legal and Empirical Analysis, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 3, 60 (2001) (finding that
prosecutors tended to disfavor younger jury members while defense attorneys tended to
disfavor older attorneys, with both race and gender effects).
274 See Anwar et. al., supra note 7, at 1004 (“[W]hen the average age of the jury pool is
older than 50 . . . defendants are convicted 79 percent of the time. In contrast, when the average
age of the jury pool is younger than 50, conviction rates are only 68 percent. These differences
are statistically significant.”). But see Jee-Yeon K. Lehmann & Jeremy Blair Smith, A
Multidimensional Examination of Jury Composition, Trial Outcomes, and Attorney
Preferences 22 (unpublished manuscript) (June 27, 2013), https://uh.edu/~jlehman2/papers/
lehmann_smith_jurycomposition.pdf (arguing that age effects may not exist when income is
taken into account).
275 See Nancy J. King and G. Thomas Munsterman, Stratified Juror Selection: CrossSection by Design, 79 JUDICATURE 273, 274 (1996) (describing how sampling techniques can
yield a more representative venire).
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achieve a mix that was more representative of the community at large.276 The
court held that such an approach violated the Jury Selection and Service Act,
which prohibits exclusion from service on account of race.277 In addition,
the court held that the plan violated Equal Protection under the Fifth
Amendment because the plan was not narrowly tailored even if it
demonstrated a compelling state interest.278
Age-based stratified jury selection, however, does not possess these legal
defects. While the Jury Selection and Service Act prohibits exclusion on the
basis of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, and economic status, age
is notably absent.279 In addition, since age classifications receive less
scrutiny under Equal Protection analysis than racial classifications, stratified
jury selection would almost certainly satisfy rational basis review.280 The
interest in age diversity also adds to the many reasons for eliminating
peremptory challenges.281 Evidence from other jurisdictions suggests that
doing so would not have a significant adverse impact on the jury system,
even if it might be unfamiliar to the American tradition.282
3. The Workplace
Age diversity has already arrived in the workplace. The aging of the
workforce has led to four generations now working side by side in many
places of employment.283 But is this a desirable state of affairs? As noted
276 See United States v. Ovalle, 136 F.3d 1092, 1095 (6th Cir. 1998) (“Section VIII. B.
of the Jury Selection Plan called for a ‘subtraction’ method of balancing the jury wheel to
ensure proportional representation of different cognizable groups in the community.”).
277 See id. at 1100.
278 See id. at 1105–06.
279 28 U.S.C. § 1862 (West 2018) (“No citizen shall be excluded from service as a grand
or petit juror in the district courts of the United States or in the Court of International Trade
on account of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or economic status.”)
280 See supra text accompanying notes 215–216.
281 See Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 266–73, (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring)
(discussing the various arguments against peremptory challenges); Nancy S. Marder, Beyond
Gender: Peremptory Challenges and the Roles of the Jury, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1041, 1051–86
(1995) (articulating the various arguments against peremptory challenges). An alternative
would be to extend Batson challenges to age. There are several persuasive reasons to regard
Batson challenges as a failure, however, such that extending this flawed machinery to age
may not address age diversity concerns. See Marder, supra note 269, at 1589–95
(summarizing Batson’s flaws).
282 See Nancy S. Marder, Two Weeks at the Old Bailey: Jury Lessons from England, 86
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 537, 555 (2011) (“The elimination of peremptories in the English jury
system suggests that jury selection can be conducted without them.”).
283 See Rhetta L. Standifer & Scott W. Lester, To See Ourselves as Others See Us: How
Perceptions of Generational Diversity Affect the Workplace, in WORK PRESSURES: NEW
AGENDAS IN COMMUNICATION 65, 65 (Dawna I. Ballard & Matthew S. McGlone eds., 2017)
(“Given that there are now four generations simultaneously in the U.S. workforce, people
often find themselves in situations with coworkers, supervisors, and customers of various ages
who have contrasting (and sometimes conflicting) viewpoints.”).
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earlier, the empirical research on the effects of age diversity has produced
mixed results.284 Until we better understand the relationship between age
diversity and workplace outcomes, the group efficacy benefits of age
diversity cannot be the normative basis on which to pursue it in that context.
Unfortunately, the other benefits and costs of age diversity are similarly
muddled. The representation rationale does not apply with as much force to
private workplaces as it does to high-profile public institutions, though some
high-status professions may generate positive representational effects. The
debiasing effects of contact between generations in the workplace might
produce benefits, but that is contingent on the nature of the workplace, as
hierarchical, anxiety-inducing, or threatening workplaces are unlikely to
engender these effects.285 Thus, the normative case for either promoting or
discouraging age diversity in employment is at best unclear. At the very
least, the results will vary significantly by workplace.
The current legal regime theoretically removes age from consideration
in employment decisions, seemingly leaving the age composition of
workplace personnel to other forces.
The Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA) prohibits the use of age in most employment
decisions for employees over 40.286 However, the case law interpreting the
ADEA has opened several avenues through which employers might be able
to employ age to diversify their workforces. First, the Supreme Court has
held that it is permissible to privilege older members of the protected class
in employment decisions, even if doing so disadvantages younger
individuals who are also members of the protected class.287 This holding
would permit employers to pursue age-based affirmative action programs,
provided that they result in the favorable treatment of older employees. This
may be a viable strategy for technology firms to pursue, given that their
workforce skews younger,288 but it may not be as valuable in other industries
where the lack of older employees is not a problem.
Second, it may also be possible to promote age diversity through the
intentional selection of policies that favor younger employees, though doing
so may require bad faith compliance with the law on behalf of employers.
The Supreme Court has held that one may use correlates of age, such as
pension status, in employment decisions, provided that they are not mere

284

See supra text accompanying notes 188–192.
See supra text accompanying notes 202–204.
286 See id.
287 See Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 600 (2004) (“We see the
text, structure, purpose, and history of the ADEA, along with its relationship to other federal
statutes, as showing that the statute does not mean to stop an employer from favoring an older
employee over a younger one.”); Michael C. Harper, ADEA Doctrinal Impediments to the
Fulfillment of the Wirtz Report Agenda, 31 U. RICH. L. REV. 757, 758–63 (1997) (explaining
the policy underpinnings of the ADEA embodied in the Wirtz Report).
288 See supra text accompanying notes 4–6.
285
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proxies for age and have a reasonable basis.289 Some recent federal appellate
courts have also construed the ADEA to prohibit disparate impact theories
of liability brought by applicants for a position, as opposed to employees.290
Thus, it may be permissible for employers to list in an ad that they seek
applicants who have no more than a certain number of years of experience.291
This could permit firms to hire younger employees to replace those who
might have left due to retirement, increasing the age diversity of the firm as
a whole.
Thus, it appears that courts have simultaneously opened the door to
certain types of age diversity initiatives as well as to age discrimination.
Whether one supports these doctrinal developments or not depends in part
on the respective weights one gives to the age diversity interest or
antidiscrimination norms. Because the case for age diversity appears to be
relatively weak in the workplace context overall, it is not a strong foundation
on which to argue for the removal of antidiscrimination protections. Instead,
a strategy of diversity management at the human resources level may be the
best way to implement whatever benefits age diversity might provide in the
workplace, while lessening its costs.292

CONCLUSION
Age is a dimension on which we might assess diversity in groups, and
there are several normative rationales for why we might seek out age
diversity in different forms. This Article is a first step in promoting age
consciousness in the legal sphere by examining the forms that age diversity
might take, the strength of age diversity as a policy interest, and the possible
methods through which to achieve different age compositions in groups or
in society as a whole.

289 See 29 U.S.C.A. § 623 (West) (“It shall not be unlawful for an employer . . . to take
any action otherwise prohibited . . . where the differentiation is based on reasonable factors
other than age.”); Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 609 (1993) (“We now clarify
that there is no disparate treatment under the ADEA when the factor motivating the employer
is some feature other than the employee’s age.”).
290 See Kleber v. CareFusion Corp., 914 F.3d 480, 485 (7th Cir. 2019) (en banc) (“In the
end, the plain language of § 4(a)(2) leaves room for only one interpretation: Congress
authorized only employees to bring disparate impact claims.”); Villarreal v. R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co., 839 F.3d 958, 970 (11th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (“We have employed the
traditional tools of statutory interpretation here, and we conclude that the only reasonable
meaning of the statute is that a job applicant cannot sue under section 4(a)(2).”).
291 See Kleber, 914 F.3d at 481 (describing how an employer asked for applicants with
no more than seven years of experience).
292 See Stephan Alexander Boehme et al., Comparative Age Management: Theoretical
Perspectives and Practical Implications, in Field, supra note 188, at 211, 226–27 (describing
human resources strategies for “age management”).
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